ETHICS IN A DEMOCRACY
PODCAST # 3: Ethics and Religion, Part 2
The central question in this third podcast is whether ethics can reasonably be grounded on religion. This topic was introduced in Podcast # 2, but more needs to be said on this subject. It is obvious that if religion is itself non-rational or irrational, then it cannot serve as a rational foundation for ethics or anything else. However, not everyone thinks that religion is irrational. Is it not reasonable to justify moral claims by following the commands of god? Plato’s Euthyphro, a dialogue written during the ancient Greek Enlightenment, probes that possibility and provides insights that are no less relevant today than they were in the fourth century B.C. I will focus on the exchange between Socrates and Euthyphro, who meet outside the courthouse in Athens where Euthyphro has come to prosecute his father for murder. Bringing charges of murder against anyone is not a light matter, but when you accuse your own father it is especially important to be able to justify your action. Euthyphro is a religious authority of some sort, though it is never made clear exactly what kind of credentials he has, if any. When Socrates asks him to justify his action, he appeals to divine sanction. In short, he claims that what his father did is wrong because the gods say it is wrong.
Socrates: We are considering the case of a servant who has killed someone, is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies before the master can learn from those who interpret the law what he ought to do with him. What makes you think that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder dies unjustly? What makes you think that on behalf of such a person a son ought to take action against his father and accuse him of murder? How could we know that all the gods agree in approving the son’s act? Explain that to me, and I’ll admire your wisdom.
Euthyphro: I can make it clear to you, but it won’t be easy (Plato’s Euthyphro, Greek p. 9).
Euthyphro has framed the matter in terms of what is holy and what is unholy, because he believes that ethics is grounded on religion — and holiness is clearly a religious category. However, Socrates has just posed the question about Euthyphro’s prosecuting of his father in terms of justice and injustice, not holiness and unholiness. Socrates continues:
Something occurred to me while you were talking to me. I said to myself: “What if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods consider the death of the servant to be unjust; does that bring me any closer to knowing the nature of holiness and unholiness? Even if we were to agree that this action is hated by the gods, that doesn’t help us understand its holiness or unholiness, because what is hated by the gods is simultaneously pleasing and dear to them.” So let’s assume that all the gods do condemn and hate such an action. And let’s say that what all the gods hate is unholy and what they all love is holy. And what some gods love and others hate is both holy and unholy or neither holy nor unholy. Is that how we should understand holiness and unholiness?
Euthyphro: Why not, Socrates?
Socrates: It’s fine as far as I’m concerned, Euthyphro. But you should consider whether this will help you teach me as you promised.
Euthyphro: I tell you, what all the gods love is holy; and the opposite, what they all hate, is unholy.
Socrates: Should we examine the truth of this claim, Euthyphro, or simply accept it on the basis of authority?
Euthyphro: We should examine it, but I’m sure it will pass the test (Plato’s Euthyphro, Greek p. 9).
From a logical perspective, the problem with Euthyphro’s answer is that it simply does not respond to the question Socrates asked. He points out that he had asked about the essence of holiness, but Euthyphro only identified one of its attributes — that the gods love it. As Socrates continues to pursue this line of analysis not only does Euthyphro fail to answer the question about the essence of holiness, but he has a similar problem when he is asked to explain the nature of justice and, more to the point we are considering, he does not understand the relationship between holiness and justice, although he pretends that he does. Whether Euthyphro realizes it or not, what becomes clear in this dialogue is that holiness and justice are separate categories. That means that holiness may be present in the absence of justice, and justice may be present in the absence of holiness. This does not mean that holiness lacks value or that religion is unimportant in human life, but, logically speaking, justice and holiness are separate values and can exist apart from each other. Socrates, in examining these ideas with Euthyphro, also points out that even if the categories overlap and what is just is also holy, that does not mean that it is just because it is holy. For example, giving money to the poor can be considered to be an instance of distributive justice, and in some religious traditions it is considered to be a holy act. Nor does it mean that if something holy is just that it is holy because it is just. In the history of the world’s religions, it is easy to find examples of people who have left the human community, turned away from ethics and politics, and sought to live a holy life through prayer, fasting, meditation, and a variety of other practices. Some religious purists, such as mystics, ignore ethical concerns and focus entirely on holiness, seeking to tend their own soul apart from other people.
That, however, is not Euthyphro’s approach. For him religion serves as the foundation of ethics, and its primary concern is to tell people how they should live their lives as individuals and as members of society. Socrates pursues that possibility with Euthyphro, but that alternative also fails to stand up under Socrates’ questioning. Perhaps religious action is concerned with caring for the gods or, as other religious traditions claim, serving God. Socrates gives Euthyphro the option of separating religion from ethics, but Euthyphro insists that holiness and justice are inextricably bound together.
Socrates: . . . I want you to tell me what part of justice is holiness. Then, being well instructed by you about the nature of holiness and its opposite, I will be able to tell Meletus not to be unjust to me or indict me for impiety.
Euthyphro: Piety or holiness, Socrates, is that part of justice which cares for the gods; another part of justice cares for human beings. [13]
Socrates: That’s helpful, Euthyphro. But there’s one little point about which I’d like to have more information. What do you mean by “care”? When applied to the gods, care can hardly be used in the same sense as when applied to other things. For instance, horses require care, and not every person is able to take care of them. Only a person skilled in training horses can do that. Isn’t that true?
Euthyphro: Quite true.
Socrates: Is it fair to say that the art of horse-training is the art of caring for horses?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: And only the dog trainer is qualified to care for dogs.
Euthyphro: True.
Socrates: So the art of the dog trainer is the art of caring for dogs?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: And the art of the farmer includes caring for cattle?
Euthyphro: That’s right.
Socrates: Would you also say that holiness is the art of caring for the gods?
Euthyphro: I would say that.
Socrates: Isn’t this kind of care always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the care is given? In the case of horses, the horse trainer’s art benefits and improves them.
Euthyphro: True.
Socrates: Just as dogs are benefited by the dog trainer’s art, and cattle by the art of the farmer. In all such cases care is given to benefit and not to harm?
Euthyphro: Certainly not to harm.
Socrates: It’s for their good?
Euthyphro: Of course.
Socrates: Now does holiness, which you define as the art of caring for the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
Euthyphro: No! That’s definitely not what I mean.
Socrates: I didn’t think that’s what you meant, Euthyphro. That’s why I asked you about the nature of this caring. I didn’t think you would say that.
Euthyphro: You’re right, Socrates; that’s not my meaning.
Socrates: Good. But now I must ask you again. What is the care for the gods that you call holy?
Euthyphro: It’s the kind that servants give to their masters.
Socrates: I see. It’s a kind of service to the gods.
Euthyphro: Exactly.
Socrates: Medicine is also a kind of service that seeks to attain some goal. Can we call it health?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: And there’s an art which serves shipbuilders, and it also seeks some result?
Euthyphro: Yes, Socrates. The goal is to build a ship.
Socrates: There’s also the art which serves the carpenter who seeks to build a house?
Euthyphro: That’s right.
Socrates: Now tell me about this art that cares for the gods. What work does it seek to accomplish? You must know the answer if, as you say, you, of all living people, are the one who is best instructed in religious matters.
Euthyphro: That’s true, Socrates.
Socrates: Tell me then, please tell me, what is the glorious work that the gods do with our help as their servants?
Euthyphro: Many and wonderful, Socrates, are the works they do.
Socrates: That’s also true of generals. But it’s easy to say what that work is. Wouldn’t you say that victory in war is their primary service?
Euthyphro: Certainly.
Socrates: Many and wonderful are the works of farmers; but their chief work is to produce food from the earth.
Euthyphro: Exactly.
Socrates: And of the many and wonderful things the gods do, which is the most important?
Euthyphro: Socrates, I’ve already told you that it takes a long time to learn all these things. I’ll simply say that holiness is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Holiness is the salvation of families and states, just as unholiness, which is displeasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction (Plato’s Euthyphro, Greek pp. 13-14).
The more Euthyphro tries to explain his understanding of the relationship between religious activity, which he connects with holiness, and morality, the more clear it becomes that the ethical quest for what is just, right, and good can be separated from religion.
When Euthyphro suggests that what really matters is “the salvation of families and states,” he turns our attention to where it really belongs when we inquire about moral values — to human beings. Moral action is concerned with caring for and benefitting human beings, not pleasing and improving the gods. The idea that human beings can improve the gods becomes even more absurd when we apply that concept to serving the single God of monotheistic religions such as Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. What could any human being do to improve or benefit a being that is Omniscient, Omnipotent, and Perfect? Plato’s analysis in the Euthyphro does not justify the conclusion that religion has nothing to do with ethics. However, separating religion and ethics into different logical categories does show that moral claims about what is right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust can be rationally justified without appealing to categories such as holiness, piety, and godliness. A considerable amount of religious activity has long been associated with non-moral or amoral pursuits. It is also true that a lot of religious activity has also been devoted to promoting the moral life, but when we follow Socrates’ lead and ask who benefits from moral action, it is people, not gods, who benefit. Conversely, atheists, agnostics, and countless people who do not profess and do not practice any kind of religion may nevertheless live exemplary moral lives, embracing and fostering what is good, right, and just.
Throughout human history this issue of how ethics and religion relate to each other is closely connected to the relationship between ethics and democracy. In today’s world, Plato’s dialogues, written shortly after the appearance in Athens of the world’s first democracy, are not well known. However, every school system in the United States teaches its students about the separation of religion and the form of democratic government prescribed in Article I the U. S. Constitution. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The men who formulated and endorsed that article were part of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment. John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, Benjamin Franklin, and many others were well educated about the ancient Greek and Roman reflections on the nature of democracy and its struggle with theocracy and tyranny. If they thought politics and ethics can only be justified by religion, it would seem that Article I would have said the opposite — that Congress should make a law respecting the establishment of religion. Instead, they said clearly that the free exercise of religion should be allowed for all citizens, but that the government itself should not prescribe religion as essential. Many of those people no doubt believed in God and in their personal world-view connected religion to ethics and politics. But they did not mandate that same belief for their fellow citizens as part of the Constitution. On this point at least some authors of the Greek Enlightenment and some from the 18th Century Enlightenment embraced a common logic, possibly for reasons that are presented in Plato’s dialogues.
Plato’s Apology and Plato’s Crito are often published with the Euthyphro, because a continuous thread runs through all three. Performed together they make a natural trilogy. Many of Plato’s fellow citizens thought that religion was essential for both ethics and politics. For example, Meletus and Anytus thought that Socrates was a threat to the Athenian republic, because they believed that he was an atheist. Their ability to indict and convict him under Athenian law shows clearly that in Plato’s Athens the separation between government and religion did not exist. In the second dialogue of Plato’s trilogy, the Apology, he tells the story of Socrates’ trial, providing a closer look at the Athenian version of democracy and its connection to politics and ethics. In the Euthyphro Socrates has clearly shown that the character Euthyphro has failed to justify his belief that his father should be prosecuted. His claim that ethics is grounded on religion has not been proved, so the matter of how ethics might be justified remains open. As the dialogue ends, Socrates pleads with him to begin the search again.
Socrates: Then we must begin again and ask about the nature of holiness. I won’t stop asking that question until I learn the answer. Please don’t be impatient, but give me your full attention and tell me the truth. Because, if anyone knows the answer, you are that person. Therefore, I’ll hold on to you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not known the nature of holiness and unholiness, I’m sure you would never, on behalf of a servant, have charged your elderly father with murder. You would not have run the risk of doing wrong in the eyes of the gods, and you would have been ashamed before the public. I’m sure, therefore, that you know the nature of holiness and of unholiness. Speak, then, Euthyphro. Don’t hide your knowledge.
Euthyphro: Some other time, Socrates. Right now I’m in a hurry. I’ve got to go.
Socrates: Oh, my friend, will you leave me without hope? I was sure you would teach me about the nature of holiness and unholiness so that I might escape from Meletus and his indictment. I might have proved to him that I had been taught what is right and wrong by Euthyphro. I could have convinced him that I had given up speculations and heresy about divine things in which I was caught through my own ignorance. I could have convinced him that I was about to lead a better life (Plato’s Euthyphro, Greek pp. 15-16).
Let’s imagine that Plato had these three dialogues performed in his Academy. His audience, which included his students (one of whom was Aristotle) would have howled at Euthyphro’s simultaneous admission that he could not justify the act of prosecuting his father and his urgent need to leave so that he can go inside the courthouse and prosecute his father.
The trilogy was performed not for Euthyphro, who is simply a character, but for the members of the Academy who were exploring the important ethical and political questions that lie at the foundation of every human community. The end of the Euthyphro leads naturally to the beginning of the Apology. Socrates has been indicted not only for atheism but also for corrupting young people. So, the issue of how religion and ethics relate to each other continues to play a key role. In the Crito, which shows Socrates in jail after he has been convicted and condemned to death, this same topic continues to shape the conversation. In my next podcast I will discuss the content of both of those dialogues with special attention to the kind of democracy that existed in Athens and how Plato treats the question of Socrates’ conviction and condemnation from the standpoint of the ethical value of justice.
PODCAST # 3: Ethics and Religion, Part 2
The central question in this third podcast is whether ethics can reasonably be grounded on religion. This topic was introduced in Podcast # 2, but more needs to be said on this subject. It is obvious that if religion is itself non-rational or irrational, then it cannot serve as a rational foundation for ethics or anything else. However, not everyone thinks that religion is irrational. Is it not reasonable to justify moral claims by following the commands of god? Plato’s Euthyphro, a dialogue written during the ancient Greek Enlightenment, probes that possibility and provides insights that are no less relevant today than they were in the fourth century B.C. I will focus on the exchange between Socrates and Euthyphro, who meet outside the courthouse in Athens where Euthyphro has come to prosecute his father for murder. Bringing charges of murder against anyone is not a light matter, but when you accuse your own father it is especially important to be able to justify your action. Euthyphro is a religious authority of some sort, though it is never made clear exactly what kind of credentials he has, if any. When Socrates asks him to justify his action, he appeals to divine sanction. In short, he claims that what his father did is wrong because the gods say it is wrong.
Socrates: We are considering the case of a servant who has killed someone, is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies before the master can learn from those who interpret the law what he ought to do with him. What makes you think that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder dies unjustly? What makes you think that on behalf of such a person a son ought to take action against his father and accuse him of murder? How could we know that all the gods agree in approving the son’s act? Explain that to me, and I’ll admire your wisdom.
Euthyphro: I can make it clear to you, but it won’t be easy (Plato’s Euthyphro, Greek p. 9).
Euthyphro has framed the matter in terms of what is holy and what is unholy, because he believes that ethics is grounded on religion — and holiness is clearly a religious category. However, Socrates has just posed the question about Euthyphro’s prosecuting of his father in terms of justice and injustice, not holiness and unholiness. Socrates continues:
Something occurred to me while you were talking to me. I said to myself: “What if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods consider the death of the servant to be unjust; does that bring me any closer to knowing the nature of holiness and unholiness? Even if we were to agree that this action is hated by the gods, that doesn’t help us understand its holiness or unholiness, because what is hated by the gods is simultaneously pleasing and dear to them.” So let’s assume that all the gods do condemn and hate such an action. And let’s say that what all the gods hate is unholy and what they all love is holy. And what some gods love and others hate is both holy and unholy or neither holy nor unholy. Is that how we should understand holiness and unholiness?
Euthyphro: Why not, Socrates?
Socrates: It’s fine as far as I’m concerned, Euthyphro. But you should consider whether this will help you teach me as you promised.
Euthyphro: I tell you, what all the gods love is holy; and the opposite, what they all hate, is unholy.
Socrates: Should we examine the truth of this claim, Euthyphro, or simply accept it on the basis of authority?
Euthyphro: We should examine it, but I’m sure it will pass the test (Plato’s Euthyphro, Greek p. 9).
From a logical perspective, the problem with Euthyphro’s answer is that it simply does not respond to the question Socrates asked. He points out that he had asked about the essence of holiness, but Euthyphro only identified one of its attributes — that the gods love it. As Socrates continues to pursue this line of analysis not only does Euthyphro fail to answer the question about the essence of holiness, but he has a similar problem when he is asked to explain the nature of justice and, more to the point we are considering, he does not understand the relationship between holiness and justice, although he pretends that he does. Whether Euthyphro realizes it or not, what becomes clear in this dialogue is that holiness and justice are separate categories. That means that holiness may be present in the absence of justice, and justice may be present in the absence of holiness. This does not mean that holiness lacks value or that religion is unimportant in human life, but, logically speaking, justice and holiness are separate values and can exist apart from each other. Socrates, in examining these ideas with Euthyphro, also points out that even if the categories overlap and what is just is also holy, that does not mean that it is just because it is holy. For example, giving money to the poor can be considered to be an instance of distributive justice, and in some religious traditions it is considered to be a holy act. Nor does it mean that if something holy is just that it is holy because it is just. In the history of the world’s religions, it is easy to find examples of people who have left the human community, turned away from ethics and politics, and sought to live a holy life through prayer, fasting, meditation, and a variety of other practices. Some religious purists, such as mystics, ignore ethical concerns and focus entirely on holiness, seeking to tend their own soul apart from other people.
That, however, is not Euthyphro’s approach. For him religion serves as the foundation of ethics, and its primary concern is to tell people how they should live their lives as individuals and as members of society. Socrates pursues that possibility with Euthyphro, but that alternative also fails to stand up under Socrates’ questioning. Perhaps religious action is concerned with caring for the gods or, as other religious traditions claim, serving God. Socrates gives Euthyphro the option of separating religion from ethics, but Euthyphro insists that holiness and justice are inextricably bound together.
Socrates: . . . I want you to tell me what part of justice is holiness. Then, being well instructed by you about the nature of holiness and its opposite, I will be able to tell Meletus not to be unjust to me or indict me for impiety.
Euthyphro: Piety or holiness, Socrates, is that part of justice which cares for the gods; another part of justice cares for human beings. [13]
Socrates: That’s helpful, Euthyphro. But there’s one little point about which I’d like to have more information. What do you mean by “care”? When applied to the gods, care can hardly be used in the same sense as when applied to other things. For instance, horses require care, and not every person is able to take care of them. Only a person skilled in training horses can do that. Isn’t that true?
Euthyphro: Quite true.
Socrates: Is it fair to say that the art of horse-training is the art of caring for horses?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: And only the dog trainer is qualified to care for dogs.
Euthyphro: True.
Socrates: So the art of the dog trainer is the art of caring for dogs?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: And the art of the farmer includes caring for cattle?
Euthyphro: That’s right.
Socrates: Would you also say that holiness is the art of caring for the gods?
Euthyphro: I would say that.
Socrates: Isn’t this kind of care always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the care is given? In the case of horses, the horse trainer’s art benefits and improves them.
Euthyphro: True.
Socrates: Just as dogs are benefited by the dog trainer’s art, and cattle by the art of the farmer. In all such cases care is given to benefit and not to harm?
Euthyphro: Certainly not to harm.
Socrates: It’s for their good?
Euthyphro: Of course.
Socrates: Now does holiness, which you define as the art of caring for the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
Euthyphro: No! That’s definitely not what I mean.
Socrates: I didn’t think that’s what you meant, Euthyphro. That’s why I asked you about the nature of this caring. I didn’t think you would say that.
Euthyphro: You’re right, Socrates; that’s not my meaning.
Socrates: Good. But now I must ask you again. What is the care for the gods that you call holy?
Euthyphro: It’s the kind that servants give to their masters.
Socrates: I see. It’s a kind of service to the gods.
Euthyphro: Exactly.
Socrates: Medicine is also a kind of service that seeks to attain some goal. Can we call it health?
Euthyphro: Yes.
Socrates: And there’s an art which serves shipbuilders, and it also seeks some result?
Euthyphro: Yes, Socrates. The goal is to build a ship.
Socrates: There’s also the art which serves the carpenter who seeks to build a house?
Euthyphro: That’s right.
Socrates: Now tell me about this art that cares for the gods. What work does it seek to accomplish? You must know the answer if, as you say, you, of all living people, are the one who is best instructed in religious matters.
Euthyphro: That’s true, Socrates.
Socrates: Tell me then, please tell me, what is the glorious work that the gods do with our help as their servants?
Euthyphro: Many and wonderful, Socrates, are the works they do.
Socrates: That’s also true of generals. But it’s easy to say what that work is. Wouldn’t you say that victory in war is their primary service?
Euthyphro: Certainly.
Socrates: Many and wonderful are the works of farmers; but their chief work is to produce food from the earth.
Euthyphro: Exactly.
Socrates: And of the many and wonderful things the gods do, which is the most important?
Euthyphro: Socrates, I’ve already told you that it takes a long time to learn all these things. I’ll simply say that holiness is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Holiness is the salvation of families and states, just as unholiness, which is displeasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction (Plato’s Euthyphro, Greek pp. 13-14).
The more Euthyphro tries to explain his understanding of the relationship between religious activity, which he connects with holiness, and morality, the more clear it becomes that the ethical quest for what is just, right, and good can be separated from religion.
When Euthyphro suggests that what really matters is “the salvation of families and states,” he turns our attention to where it really belongs when we inquire about moral values — to human beings. Moral action is concerned with caring for and benefitting human beings, not pleasing and improving the gods. The idea that human beings can improve the gods becomes even more absurd when we apply that concept to serving the single God of monotheistic religions such as Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. What could any human being do to improve or benefit a being that is Omniscient, Omnipotent, and Perfect? Plato’s analysis in the Euthyphro does not justify the conclusion that religion has nothing to do with ethics. However, separating religion and ethics into different logical categories does show that moral claims about what is right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust can be rationally justified without appealing to categories such as holiness, piety, and godliness. A considerable amount of religious activity has long been associated with non-moral or amoral pursuits. It is also true that a lot of religious activity has also been devoted to promoting the moral life, but when we follow Socrates’ lead and ask who benefits from moral action, it is people, not gods, who benefit. Conversely, atheists, agnostics, and countless people who do not profess and do not practice any kind of religion may nevertheless live exemplary moral lives, embracing and fostering what is good, right, and just.
Throughout human history this issue of how ethics and religion relate to each other is closely connected to the relationship between ethics and democracy. In today’s world, Plato’s dialogues, written shortly after the appearance in Athens of the world’s first democracy, are not well known. However, every school system in the United States teaches its students about the separation of religion and the form of democratic government prescribed in Article I the U. S. Constitution. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The men who formulated and endorsed that article were part of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment. John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, Benjamin Franklin, and many others were well educated about the ancient Greek and Roman reflections on the nature of democracy and its struggle with theocracy and tyranny. If they thought politics and ethics can only be justified by religion, it would seem that Article I would have said the opposite — that Congress should make a law respecting the establishment of religion. Instead, they said clearly that the free exercise of religion should be allowed for all citizens, but that the government itself should not prescribe religion as essential. Many of those people no doubt believed in God and in their personal world-view connected religion to ethics and politics. But they did not mandate that same belief for their fellow citizens as part of the Constitution. On this point at least some authors of the Greek Enlightenment and some from the 18th Century Enlightenment embraced a common logic, possibly for reasons that are presented in Plato’s dialogues.
Plato’s Apology and Plato’s Crito are often published with the Euthyphro, because a continuous thread runs through all three. Performed together they make a natural trilogy. Many of Plato’s fellow citizens thought that religion was essential for both ethics and politics. For example, Meletus and Anytus thought that Socrates was a threat to the Athenian republic, because they believed that he was an atheist. Their ability to indict and convict him under Athenian law shows clearly that in Plato’s Athens the separation between government and religion did not exist. In the second dialogue of Plato’s trilogy, the Apology, he tells the story of Socrates’ trial, providing a closer look at the Athenian version of democracy and its connection to politics and ethics. In the Euthyphro Socrates has clearly shown that the character Euthyphro has failed to justify his belief that his father should be prosecuted. His claim that ethics is grounded on religion has not been proved, so the matter of how ethics might be justified remains open. As the dialogue ends, Socrates pleads with him to begin the search again.
Socrates: Then we must begin again and ask about the nature of holiness. I won’t stop asking that question until I learn the answer. Please don’t be impatient, but give me your full attention and tell me the truth. Because, if anyone knows the answer, you are that person. Therefore, I’ll hold on to you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not known the nature of holiness and unholiness, I’m sure you would never, on behalf of a servant, have charged your elderly father with murder. You would not have run the risk of doing wrong in the eyes of the gods, and you would have been ashamed before the public. I’m sure, therefore, that you know the nature of holiness and of unholiness. Speak, then, Euthyphro. Don’t hide your knowledge.
Euthyphro: Some other time, Socrates. Right now I’m in a hurry. I’ve got to go.
Socrates: Oh, my friend, will you leave me without hope? I was sure you would teach me about the nature of holiness and unholiness so that I might escape from Meletus and his indictment. I might have proved to him that I had been taught what is right and wrong by Euthyphro. I could have convinced him that I had given up speculations and heresy about divine things in which I was caught through my own ignorance. I could have convinced him that I was about to lead a better life (Plato’s Euthyphro, Greek pp. 15-16).
Let’s imagine that Plato had these three dialogues performed in his Academy. His audience, which included his students (one of whom was Aristotle) would have howled at Euthyphro’s simultaneous admission that he could not justify the act of prosecuting his father and his urgent need to leave so that he can go inside the courthouse and prosecute his father.
The trilogy was performed not for Euthyphro, who is simply a character, but for the members of the Academy who were exploring the important ethical and political questions that lie at the foundation of every human community. The end of the Euthyphro leads naturally to the beginning of the Apology. Socrates has been indicted not only for atheism but also for corrupting young people. So, the issue of how religion and ethics relate to each other continues to play a key role. In the Crito, which shows Socrates in jail after he has been convicted and condemned to death, this same topic continues to shape the conversation. In my next podcast I will discuss the content of both of those dialogues with special attention to the kind of democracy that existed in Athens and how Plato treats the question of Socrates’ conviction and condemnation from the standpoint of the ethical value of justice.