World Community
Podcast #5: Ethical and Political Foundations of Community
In the first four podcasts of this series, I examined the model in which a single nation presides over a global empire. Now I will turn to the idea of a common human community that preserves autonomy, mutual respect, and diversity. During the 18th century, sometimes called the age of enlightenment, thinkers in Europe and America developed a philosophy that justified the American Revolution and provided the fundamental principles on which the U.S. Constitution was developed. In this podcast I will take a closer look at the ethical philosophy that grew out of the Enlightenment as part of the search for the foundations on which a world community might be based.
What is Enlightenment? The German philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote one of the definitive essays on the meaning of Enlightenment. Kant’s short work called “What is Enlightenment?” was published in 1784. Another much longer and far more comprehensive manuscript — The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals — was published in 1785. Those dates are significant because they fall between the American Revolution and the French Revolution, two events that have defined the way community is constructed in the modern world.
In recent years there has been considerable discussion and analysis of the nature of modernism. Earlier in this series I linked modernism and the nation state. Now it is time to consider the fate of the nation state in the contemporary world and the emergence of postmodernism as a way of describing the current way of thinking. Is nationalism viable in the current global context? Are the fundamental principles of Enlightenment philosophy obsolete? In order to address those questions, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the terms “enlightenment” and “nationalism.” In this podcast I will focus on the concept of enlightenment.
Kant begins his essay on the nature of enlightenment with a provocative claim. He defines enlightenment as “our release from self-imposed dependence” (Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” [translated by Leo Rauch and published in Foundations of Ethics by Agora Publications, Inc., 1995], p. 1). In other words, Kant says that if we are not enlightened, it is our own fault. “Dependence is the inability to use our own reasoning. Instead we rely on others to do our thinking for us” (ibid.). If we are not enlightened, it is a failure of our will, not a flaw in our intellect. “Have the courage to think for yourself! This is the motto of the Enlightenment” (ibid.). The radical nature of Kant’s claim is often overlooked. Those who turn to external forces to explain — and often to excuse — human actions make the very mistake Kant identifies in this essay. He would have little patience for the psychological, social, historical, and physiological determinists who played a central role in the discussion of human behavior in the 20th century. Whether we blame our genes, our abuse as children, our poverty, or any other external forces for our state of dependence, we fail in precisely the way Kant says we do. “Why do so many people remain dependent? The answer is laziness and cowardice” (ibid.). This is strong language. But we dare not back away from it if we wish to understand the power of Kant’s analysis of the human condition and how it relates to his enlightenment vision of ethics and politics.
In essence, Kant says that human beings are ultimately responsible for their own destiny. This does not mean we are morally disconnected from other human beings. In The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, he argues explicitly that we have what he calls an “imperfect duty” to help others who are in need (Foundations of Ethics, p. 39). But the primary goal of such help should be to assist others in becoming self-sufficient and autonomous, not to increase their dependence. The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006 is a splendid example of the point Kant makes about reducing dependence and promoting autonomy. Muhamad Yunus and the Grameen Bank received the Nobel Prize for the practice of making small loans to poor rural people — mostly women — in Bangladesh. Loans as small as $12 were given to help them build small businesses and become self-sufficient (The New York Times, October 14, 2006). This vision has been replicated throughout the world. “Last year, more than 100 million people received small loans from more than 3,100 institutions in 130 countries, according to Microcredit Summit, a Washington-based non profit advocacy group that Mr. Yunus helped found. The average loan from Grameen Bank was $130” (ibid.). Most remarkable is that the people who borrow money repay those loans. The bankers Mr. Yunus initially approached with the concept of “microcredit” rejected the idea, which they considered to be foolish. The courage and industry he displayed by fighting for and implementing his vision are the opposite of the cowardice and laziness that Kant says are lacking in those who remain dependent and, therefore, unenlightened. We often hear the claim that poverty is the result of laziness. Kant would be more likely to blame rich people who lack the courage to think of creative ways of helping others and who avoid the risk that might involve. Such cowardice often prevails in the boardrooms of multinational corporations and international banks. This Nobel Peace Prize symbolizes the power of courage and industry for even the poorest people to achieve enlightenment and independence throughout the globe.
As important as economic wellbeing is, Kant’s primary focus is on the life of the mind and its role in shaping all aspects of human existence. Consider Kant’s injunction to “think for yourself.” Unfortunately, that has become a formula, a mantra used by parents, teachers, and authors of popular self-improvement books. When that happens dependence, not independence, prevails.
Formulas and rules—those mechanical tools of rational use, or rather misuse, of our natural gifts—are the shackles of eternal dependence. To cast them off for a leap over even the narrowest ditch is risky if we are not accustomed to it. This is why few people can free themselves from dependence by their own wits and pursue their own steady course (Foundations of Ethics, p. 1).
Appeal to authority — whether in religion, medicine, education, or any other human activity — fosters dependence rather than enlightenment. And it is self-imposed, because it is we who accept and follow the orders and prescriptions imposed and proposed by others. This is true whether we are considering decisions by individuals concerning their own personal welfare or political decisions that shape the communities of which we are members. The Americans had already staged a successful revolution when Kant wrote the following words: “Revolutions may bring about a rejection of individual despotism and of greedy and oppressive subjection, but they will never lead to a true change of mind. Rather, new prejudices as well as old ones will direct the thoughtless masses” (ibid. p. 2). The French Revolution soon brought clear evidence for Kant’s claim when it led to the Reign of Terror. Then came Napoleon Bonaparte and the rise of the French Empire that brought new forms of dependence. The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Iranian Revolution of 1973 provide additional examples supporting Kant’s point.
This discussion also makes it clear that it is a mistake to try separate ethics from politics. The way we think about ethics has profound influence on political action, and our participation in political community will inevitably shape our way of thinking about ethics. Kant’s ethical theory and his political thinking are inextricably connected. Enlightenment in ethics and in politics requires freedom. What, exactly, does Kant mean by freedom? “To reach enlightenment we need freedom, that is, the least harmful form of what we call freedom, namely the use of one’s ability to reason openly about things” (ibid.). Few words have been more misused and distorted than “freedom.” If philosophy is defined as the “rational analysis and justification of fundamental concepts, principles, decisions, and actions,” then the concept of freedom is in special need of philosophical analysis. Kant’s reflections on that concept are especially important, because he provides a way of thinking about that term that lies at the heart of the Enlightenment. Freedom is, above all, about the “ability to reason openly about things.” To say that we ought to think for ourselves might at first seem to mean that we, as isolated and separate individuals, should engage in a subjective and private activity. But that is clearly not what Kant means.
Kant distinguishes between what he calls the “public” use of reason and its “private” use. Thinking is not a subjective, isolated process. Kant says: “By public use of reason I am referring to its use by a scholar before a readership” (ibid.). We should not take these words too literally. Kant does not mean to limit “scholarship” to an academic or an elite domain. Anyone who engages in public discourse of any kind may be included in the realm of scholarship. To be a scholar is to participate in the process of “rational analysis and justification,” regardless of the subject matter. But this process must be “public and sharable.” Since Kant’s time, technology has expanded far beyond the printing press that made it possible to have a “readership.” Electronic media, including the internet, have expanded the realm of communication to include other forms of expression and potentially to reach the entire human community. Anyone who puts a podcast or a blog on the internet is participating in the process that Kant has in mind. This is the most fundamental and necessary condition of enlightenment: “It is the public use of reason that must always be free; it alone can bring about enlightenment among people” (ibid.).
With this in mind, let’s consider the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution. “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Whether or not Kant had that specific piece of legislation in mind, his analysis of the necessary condition for enlightenment coincides with the most urgent demands built into the very foundations of government when the United States was created. As Kant argues so cogently, it is impossible for individuals or communities to be free if they are unable to participate in public reasoning. The First Amendment is designed to assure such participation. Since the 18th century, as the media used for communication have evolved, both Congress and the Federal courts have added them to the list of protected means of manifesting public reason. The importance of Kant’s vision is that it extends far beyond his context in Prussia in the 18th century. Kant is making a claim about what is required for any person or any community that seeks enlightenment at any time and in any place. In other words, it is a universal claim.
Autonomy
In spite of its brevity and its specific focus, Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?” opens a much broader discussion about the nature of ethical and political philosophy. Legislation in the political domain presupposes definite ethical principles. In his various writings on ethics, Kant attempts to articulate and justify the fundamental ethical principles that apply to individuals and communities everywhere. The concept of autonomy is the most important idea in Kant’s ethical philosophy. The core of that concept was already presented in “What is Enlightenment?” Kant says: “ The test for a legislative decision lies in the question whether the people themselves would want to impose such a law on themselves” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 4). Framing the idea of freedom in this way makes it clear that to be free does not mean that people may do whatever they want but that freedom is a function of law, not of lawlessness.
The word “autonomy” is composed of two Greek words: auto and nomos. Auto means self and nomos means law. So, to be autonomous is to impose a law on yourself. This is true of moral laws that guide the actions and decisions of individuals and of the political laws that regulate communities. In The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explicitly contrasts autonomy and heteronomy. Here, again, the Greek roots of the term are instructive. Hetero means “other.” A heteronomous law is one imposed from the outside, by someone else. Kant draws heavily on this distinction as he develops his ethical theory. He says: “The autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of morality,” and “the heteronomy of the will is the source of all flawed principles of morality” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 54). This distinction has wide-ranging implications for the ideal of moral responsibility. To say that “all flawed principles of morality” have heteronomy as their source is another radical claim that is often overlooked. Kant was well aware of how controversial this way of thinking about ethics would be, but he insisted on its centrality to the very possibility of making a sound ethical judgment.
The controversy arises from Kant’s demand that ethics must be universal and willingly embraced by those who impose fundamental ethical principles on themselves. This approach contrasts with that of thinkers who insist that ethics is grounded in experience, especially the sensations of pleasure and pain. Kant is reacting to Empiricists such as David Hume and Utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham who championed a popular ethical theory that is grounded in immediate experience and promises happiness as its ultimate reward. Kant is clear about his opposition to that way of thinking.
The principle of personal happiness is the most questionable of all. It is false, and besides, experience contradicts the allegation that well-being is always proportional to good conduct. It is also questionable, because it contributes nothing to establishing a true basis for morality. Making someone happy is quite different from making someone good (Foundations of Ethics, p. 55).
The main reason that the empirical approach cannot provide a true basis for morality is that our experiences are so diverse. Our personal circumstances, our history, our desires, passions, tastes, and feelings all differ from those of other people. That way of thinking about ethics leads to subjectivism and relativism. A true basis for morality must be universal, not particular and subjective. It would be especially hopeless to try to ground a world community on this way of thinking about what Kant calls “the principle of happiness” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 55).
Another difficulty with the appeal to happiness defined in terms of pleasure and pain is that it rules out freedom. Jeremy Bentham’s version of utilitarianism makes this crystal clear. Bentham says:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light (Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chapter 1, published in 1781).
It is hard to think of a more blatant example of heteronomy. According to Bentham, forces outside of our control shape and dominate human will. We are, in other words, slaves of our sensations, feelings, and emotions. No human tyrant is as severe and inflexible as the vision of Nature presented in Bentham’s philosophy. A human tyrant might have a change of heart, choosing freely to follow another path, perhaps even one that would free the slaves. But the determinism in Bentham’s scheme is absolute and relentless.
Kant’s ethical vision, which I can only summarize briefly, demands autonomy and shuns heteronomy, “the source of all flawed principles of morality.” The most familiar element of Kant’s ethical philosophy is what he calls the “categorical imperative.” Kant says: “There is only one categorical imperative, and this is it: Act only on the maxim by which you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 37). Unfortunately, too many interpreters of Kant try to use this formulation as a formula — and to do that is, as we have already seen, the opposite of enlightenment: “Formulas and rules—those mechanical tools of rational use, or rather misuse, of our natural gifts—are the shackles of eternal dependence.” Rather than providing a formula for ethical action, Kant is offering a method by which we can think for ourselves about ethical questions. Although there is “only one categorical imperative,” it has three aspects that help us understand its true nature.
One of those aspects is autonomy — the practice of formulating and applying laws by ourselves and for ourselves. Kant does not see this as an activity of isolated individuals, although the individual will is the agency that is ultimately responsible for deciding and acting. Autonomy also has a social and political form, what Kant calls a “republican system.” Kant says:
All law must be based on the following principles: First, the principle of freedom for all members — as human beings — in a society; second, the principle of dependence — as subjects — on a single shared system of legislation; [350] and third, a constitution based on the principle of equality for all — as citizens. With regard to the law, it is, by definition, that on which all other forms of civil constitution are based and from which they originate (Immanuel Kant, Toward Lasting Peace, translated by Lieselotte Anderson and Albert A. Anderson, published by Agora Publications, Inc., 2006, p. 11).
The categorical imperative is the “supreme principle of morality,” because it alone is morally binding on all people and allows them to be true moral agents. Any principle that shifts responsibility and control from the free choice of human beings, whether to an external nature, to a divine being, or to a political authority (such as a Leviathan or a philosopher king) undermines the very possibility of moral choice and action.
To conceive of the categorical imperative as a single principle with three aspects, imagine a triangle with the idea of autonomy as its base. The second side of that triangle is the idea of universality. When Kant says that we should act “according the maxim by which you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law,” he is emphasizing the idea of universality. If the general principle — the maxim — of an act or a decision cannot be applied to all other persons, it lacks moral force. Kant is not saying that everyone must, in fact, agree with what I will. There are no general principles that all people embrace at all times. In other words, Kant is not saying that moral laws are universal but that they can be applied universally. Immediately after stating the categorical imperative, Kant provides some examples to clarify what he means. One of those examples pertains to lying when making a promise. If I borrow money and promise to pay it back knowing full well that I will not be able to do so, I am lying. What if the maxim of that act were to be universalized? It is immediately evident that this could never become a universal law. Kant says: “A universal law stating that anyone who believes himself to be in need can promise anything, without any intention of repayment, would make promising impossible, since no one would believe the promise, and would ridicule it as meaningless pretense” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 39). Any moral claim that cannot be universalized cannot be justified as ethically binding.
The third side of that triangle is the idea of the intrinsic value of persons. In clarifying this aspect of the categorical imperative and seeking to justify it, he says: “The ground of this principle is this: rational nature exists as an end in itself” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 44). Here it is easy to misunderstand Kant, because the term “rational nature” is not an obvious synonym for “person,” but that is what he means. Kant’s point is that when we think of our own existence we consider it to be intrinsically valuable, and every other person also sees existence in this way — on the same rational basis that makes it applicable to us (ibid.). This leads Kant to provide a second way of stating the categorical imperative: “Act in such a way that at all times you relate to humanity (whether it be in your own person or in the person of another) as an end, never as a mere means to an end” (ibid.). All persons are ends in themselves. Kant says this is “the highest limiting condition for the freedom of action in every person” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 45). In this light it is clear why autonomy, universality, and the intrinsic value of persons must be considered as a single, coherent principle.
Because autonomy has both a personal and a political manifestation, we must move from a consideration of personal ethical principles to the basic principles of political life. This is especially important in light of the overall topic of this series — world community. Does Kant provide the foundation on which a world community might be conceived? I will consider that question in my next podcast.
Podcast #5: Ethical and Political Foundations of Community
In the first four podcasts of this series, I examined the model in which a single nation presides over a global empire. Now I will turn to the idea of a common human community that preserves autonomy, mutual respect, and diversity. During the 18th century, sometimes called the age of enlightenment, thinkers in Europe and America developed a philosophy that justified the American Revolution and provided the fundamental principles on which the U.S. Constitution was developed. In this podcast I will take a closer look at the ethical philosophy that grew out of the Enlightenment as part of the search for the foundations on which a world community might be based.
What is Enlightenment? The German philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote one of the definitive essays on the meaning of Enlightenment. Kant’s short work called “What is Enlightenment?” was published in 1784. Another much longer and far more comprehensive manuscript — The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals — was published in 1785. Those dates are significant because they fall between the American Revolution and the French Revolution, two events that have defined the way community is constructed in the modern world.
In recent years there has been considerable discussion and analysis of the nature of modernism. Earlier in this series I linked modernism and the nation state. Now it is time to consider the fate of the nation state in the contemporary world and the emergence of postmodernism as a way of describing the current way of thinking. Is nationalism viable in the current global context? Are the fundamental principles of Enlightenment philosophy obsolete? In order to address those questions, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the terms “enlightenment” and “nationalism.” In this podcast I will focus on the concept of enlightenment.
Kant begins his essay on the nature of enlightenment with a provocative claim. He defines enlightenment as “our release from self-imposed dependence” (Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” [translated by Leo Rauch and published in Foundations of Ethics by Agora Publications, Inc., 1995], p. 1). In other words, Kant says that if we are not enlightened, it is our own fault. “Dependence is the inability to use our own reasoning. Instead we rely on others to do our thinking for us” (ibid.). If we are not enlightened, it is a failure of our will, not a flaw in our intellect. “Have the courage to think for yourself! This is the motto of the Enlightenment” (ibid.). The radical nature of Kant’s claim is often overlooked. Those who turn to external forces to explain — and often to excuse — human actions make the very mistake Kant identifies in this essay. He would have little patience for the psychological, social, historical, and physiological determinists who played a central role in the discussion of human behavior in the 20th century. Whether we blame our genes, our abuse as children, our poverty, or any other external forces for our state of dependence, we fail in precisely the way Kant says we do. “Why do so many people remain dependent? The answer is laziness and cowardice” (ibid.). This is strong language. But we dare not back away from it if we wish to understand the power of Kant’s analysis of the human condition and how it relates to his enlightenment vision of ethics and politics.
In essence, Kant says that human beings are ultimately responsible for their own destiny. This does not mean we are morally disconnected from other human beings. In The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, he argues explicitly that we have what he calls an “imperfect duty” to help others who are in need (Foundations of Ethics, p. 39). But the primary goal of such help should be to assist others in becoming self-sufficient and autonomous, not to increase their dependence. The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006 is a splendid example of the point Kant makes about reducing dependence and promoting autonomy. Muhamad Yunus and the Grameen Bank received the Nobel Prize for the practice of making small loans to poor rural people — mostly women — in Bangladesh. Loans as small as $12 were given to help them build small businesses and become self-sufficient (The New York Times, October 14, 2006). This vision has been replicated throughout the world. “Last year, more than 100 million people received small loans from more than 3,100 institutions in 130 countries, according to Microcredit Summit, a Washington-based non profit advocacy group that Mr. Yunus helped found. The average loan from Grameen Bank was $130” (ibid.). Most remarkable is that the people who borrow money repay those loans. The bankers Mr. Yunus initially approached with the concept of “microcredit” rejected the idea, which they considered to be foolish. The courage and industry he displayed by fighting for and implementing his vision are the opposite of the cowardice and laziness that Kant says are lacking in those who remain dependent and, therefore, unenlightened. We often hear the claim that poverty is the result of laziness. Kant would be more likely to blame rich people who lack the courage to think of creative ways of helping others and who avoid the risk that might involve. Such cowardice often prevails in the boardrooms of multinational corporations and international banks. This Nobel Peace Prize symbolizes the power of courage and industry for even the poorest people to achieve enlightenment and independence throughout the globe.
As important as economic wellbeing is, Kant’s primary focus is on the life of the mind and its role in shaping all aspects of human existence. Consider Kant’s injunction to “think for yourself.” Unfortunately, that has become a formula, a mantra used by parents, teachers, and authors of popular self-improvement books. When that happens dependence, not independence, prevails.
Formulas and rules—those mechanical tools of rational use, or rather misuse, of our natural gifts—are the shackles of eternal dependence. To cast them off for a leap over even the narrowest ditch is risky if we are not accustomed to it. This is why few people can free themselves from dependence by their own wits and pursue their own steady course (Foundations of Ethics, p. 1).
Appeal to authority — whether in religion, medicine, education, or any other human activity — fosters dependence rather than enlightenment. And it is self-imposed, because it is we who accept and follow the orders and prescriptions imposed and proposed by others. This is true whether we are considering decisions by individuals concerning their own personal welfare or political decisions that shape the communities of which we are members. The Americans had already staged a successful revolution when Kant wrote the following words: “Revolutions may bring about a rejection of individual despotism and of greedy and oppressive subjection, but they will never lead to a true change of mind. Rather, new prejudices as well as old ones will direct the thoughtless masses” (ibid. p. 2). The French Revolution soon brought clear evidence for Kant’s claim when it led to the Reign of Terror. Then came Napoleon Bonaparte and the rise of the French Empire that brought new forms of dependence. The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Iranian Revolution of 1973 provide additional examples supporting Kant’s point.
This discussion also makes it clear that it is a mistake to try separate ethics from politics. The way we think about ethics has profound influence on political action, and our participation in political community will inevitably shape our way of thinking about ethics. Kant’s ethical theory and his political thinking are inextricably connected. Enlightenment in ethics and in politics requires freedom. What, exactly, does Kant mean by freedom? “To reach enlightenment we need freedom, that is, the least harmful form of what we call freedom, namely the use of one’s ability to reason openly about things” (ibid.). Few words have been more misused and distorted than “freedom.” If philosophy is defined as the “rational analysis and justification of fundamental concepts, principles, decisions, and actions,” then the concept of freedom is in special need of philosophical analysis. Kant’s reflections on that concept are especially important, because he provides a way of thinking about that term that lies at the heart of the Enlightenment. Freedom is, above all, about the “ability to reason openly about things.” To say that we ought to think for ourselves might at first seem to mean that we, as isolated and separate individuals, should engage in a subjective and private activity. But that is clearly not what Kant means.
Kant distinguishes between what he calls the “public” use of reason and its “private” use. Thinking is not a subjective, isolated process. Kant says: “By public use of reason I am referring to its use by a scholar before a readership” (ibid.). We should not take these words too literally. Kant does not mean to limit “scholarship” to an academic or an elite domain. Anyone who engages in public discourse of any kind may be included in the realm of scholarship. To be a scholar is to participate in the process of “rational analysis and justification,” regardless of the subject matter. But this process must be “public and sharable.” Since Kant’s time, technology has expanded far beyond the printing press that made it possible to have a “readership.” Electronic media, including the internet, have expanded the realm of communication to include other forms of expression and potentially to reach the entire human community. Anyone who puts a podcast or a blog on the internet is participating in the process that Kant has in mind. This is the most fundamental and necessary condition of enlightenment: “It is the public use of reason that must always be free; it alone can bring about enlightenment among people” (ibid.).
With this in mind, let’s consider the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution. “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Whether or not Kant had that specific piece of legislation in mind, his analysis of the necessary condition for enlightenment coincides with the most urgent demands built into the very foundations of government when the United States was created. As Kant argues so cogently, it is impossible for individuals or communities to be free if they are unable to participate in public reasoning. The First Amendment is designed to assure such participation. Since the 18th century, as the media used for communication have evolved, both Congress and the Federal courts have added them to the list of protected means of manifesting public reason. The importance of Kant’s vision is that it extends far beyond his context in Prussia in the 18th century. Kant is making a claim about what is required for any person or any community that seeks enlightenment at any time and in any place. In other words, it is a universal claim.
Autonomy
In spite of its brevity and its specific focus, Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?” opens a much broader discussion about the nature of ethical and political philosophy. Legislation in the political domain presupposes definite ethical principles. In his various writings on ethics, Kant attempts to articulate and justify the fundamental ethical principles that apply to individuals and communities everywhere. The concept of autonomy is the most important idea in Kant’s ethical philosophy. The core of that concept was already presented in “What is Enlightenment?” Kant says: “ The test for a legislative decision lies in the question whether the people themselves would want to impose such a law on themselves” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 4). Framing the idea of freedom in this way makes it clear that to be free does not mean that people may do whatever they want but that freedom is a function of law, not of lawlessness.
The word “autonomy” is composed of two Greek words: auto and nomos. Auto means self and nomos means law. So, to be autonomous is to impose a law on yourself. This is true of moral laws that guide the actions and decisions of individuals and of the political laws that regulate communities. In The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explicitly contrasts autonomy and heteronomy. Here, again, the Greek roots of the term are instructive. Hetero means “other.” A heteronomous law is one imposed from the outside, by someone else. Kant draws heavily on this distinction as he develops his ethical theory. He says: “The autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of morality,” and “the heteronomy of the will is the source of all flawed principles of morality” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 54). This distinction has wide-ranging implications for the ideal of moral responsibility. To say that “all flawed principles of morality” have heteronomy as their source is another radical claim that is often overlooked. Kant was well aware of how controversial this way of thinking about ethics would be, but he insisted on its centrality to the very possibility of making a sound ethical judgment.
The controversy arises from Kant’s demand that ethics must be universal and willingly embraced by those who impose fundamental ethical principles on themselves. This approach contrasts with that of thinkers who insist that ethics is grounded in experience, especially the sensations of pleasure and pain. Kant is reacting to Empiricists such as David Hume and Utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham who championed a popular ethical theory that is grounded in immediate experience and promises happiness as its ultimate reward. Kant is clear about his opposition to that way of thinking.
The principle of personal happiness is the most questionable of all. It is false, and besides, experience contradicts the allegation that well-being is always proportional to good conduct. It is also questionable, because it contributes nothing to establishing a true basis for morality. Making someone happy is quite different from making someone good (Foundations of Ethics, p. 55).
The main reason that the empirical approach cannot provide a true basis for morality is that our experiences are so diverse. Our personal circumstances, our history, our desires, passions, tastes, and feelings all differ from those of other people. That way of thinking about ethics leads to subjectivism and relativism. A true basis for morality must be universal, not particular and subjective. It would be especially hopeless to try to ground a world community on this way of thinking about what Kant calls “the principle of happiness” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 55).
Another difficulty with the appeal to happiness defined in terms of pleasure and pain is that it rules out freedom. Jeremy Bentham’s version of utilitarianism makes this crystal clear. Bentham says:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light (Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chapter 1, published in 1781).
It is hard to think of a more blatant example of heteronomy. According to Bentham, forces outside of our control shape and dominate human will. We are, in other words, slaves of our sensations, feelings, and emotions. No human tyrant is as severe and inflexible as the vision of Nature presented in Bentham’s philosophy. A human tyrant might have a change of heart, choosing freely to follow another path, perhaps even one that would free the slaves. But the determinism in Bentham’s scheme is absolute and relentless.
Kant’s ethical vision, which I can only summarize briefly, demands autonomy and shuns heteronomy, “the source of all flawed principles of morality.” The most familiar element of Kant’s ethical philosophy is what he calls the “categorical imperative.” Kant says: “There is only one categorical imperative, and this is it: Act only on the maxim by which you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 37). Unfortunately, too many interpreters of Kant try to use this formulation as a formula — and to do that is, as we have already seen, the opposite of enlightenment: “Formulas and rules—those mechanical tools of rational use, or rather misuse, of our natural gifts—are the shackles of eternal dependence.” Rather than providing a formula for ethical action, Kant is offering a method by which we can think for ourselves about ethical questions. Although there is “only one categorical imperative,” it has three aspects that help us understand its true nature.
One of those aspects is autonomy — the practice of formulating and applying laws by ourselves and for ourselves. Kant does not see this as an activity of isolated individuals, although the individual will is the agency that is ultimately responsible for deciding and acting. Autonomy also has a social and political form, what Kant calls a “republican system.” Kant says:
All law must be based on the following principles: First, the principle of freedom for all members — as human beings — in a society; second, the principle of dependence — as subjects — on a single shared system of legislation; [350] and third, a constitution based on the principle of equality for all — as citizens. With regard to the law, it is, by definition, that on which all other forms of civil constitution are based and from which they originate (Immanuel Kant, Toward Lasting Peace, translated by Lieselotte Anderson and Albert A. Anderson, published by Agora Publications, Inc., 2006, p. 11).
The categorical imperative is the “supreme principle of morality,” because it alone is morally binding on all people and allows them to be true moral agents. Any principle that shifts responsibility and control from the free choice of human beings, whether to an external nature, to a divine being, or to a political authority (such as a Leviathan or a philosopher king) undermines the very possibility of moral choice and action.
To conceive of the categorical imperative as a single principle with three aspects, imagine a triangle with the idea of autonomy as its base. The second side of that triangle is the idea of universality. When Kant says that we should act “according the maxim by which you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law,” he is emphasizing the idea of universality. If the general principle — the maxim — of an act or a decision cannot be applied to all other persons, it lacks moral force. Kant is not saying that everyone must, in fact, agree with what I will. There are no general principles that all people embrace at all times. In other words, Kant is not saying that moral laws are universal but that they can be applied universally. Immediately after stating the categorical imperative, Kant provides some examples to clarify what he means. One of those examples pertains to lying when making a promise. If I borrow money and promise to pay it back knowing full well that I will not be able to do so, I am lying. What if the maxim of that act were to be universalized? It is immediately evident that this could never become a universal law. Kant says: “A universal law stating that anyone who believes himself to be in need can promise anything, without any intention of repayment, would make promising impossible, since no one would believe the promise, and would ridicule it as meaningless pretense” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 39). Any moral claim that cannot be universalized cannot be justified as ethically binding.
The third side of that triangle is the idea of the intrinsic value of persons. In clarifying this aspect of the categorical imperative and seeking to justify it, he says: “The ground of this principle is this: rational nature exists as an end in itself” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 44). Here it is easy to misunderstand Kant, because the term “rational nature” is not an obvious synonym for “person,” but that is what he means. Kant’s point is that when we think of our own existence we consider it to be intrinsically valuable, and every other person also sees existence in this way — on the same rational basis that makes it applicable to us (ibid.). This leads Kant to provide a second way of stating the categorical imperative: “Act in such a way that at all times you relate to humanity (whether it be in your own person or in the person of another) as an end, never as a mere means to an end” (ibid.). All persons are ends in themselves. Kant says this is “the highest limiting condition for the freedom of action in every person” (Foundations of Ethics, p. 45). In this light it is clear why autonomy, universality, and the intrinsic value of persons must be considered as a single, coherent principle.
Because autonomy has both a personal and a political manifestation, we must move from a consideration of personal ethical principles to the basic principles of political life. This is especially important in light of the overall topic of this series — world community. Does Kant provide the foundation on which a world community might be conceived? I will consider that question in my next podcast.