World Community
Podcast #6: The Dilemma of Nationalism in the Modern World
In Podcast #5 I outlined Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory and asked the following question: Does Kant provide the political foundation on which a world community might be conceived? Kant did not write a major work on social and political philosophy, but his works on ethics and some of his short essays provide helpful ideas about the nature of community and its philosophical foundations. Some scholars think Kant’s political philosophy has been seriously underestimated. For example, Professor Hans Reiss of the University of Bristol says: “Kant should be accorded a prominent place in the history of Western political thought, a place which has far too long been denied him. He ought to be ranked among the leading political thinkers of all time. Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes are his peers. He is second to none in acuteness of his thinking.” (Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 39). Instead of a major work on politics, Kant wrote several shorter essays on that topic. For example, he published an essay in 1795 called Toward Lasting Peace. The high hopes of the Enlightenment that gave rise to the American and the French Revolutions had been dampened by the Reign of Terror in which tens of thousands of people died. The perpetual vacillation between war and temporary armistice seemed to be inescapable. In thinking about the possibility of bringing an end to that vicious cycle, Kant laid the foundations for a kind of community that might provide an alternative to imperialism and colonialism. Kant’s essay is best known as an early articulation of the idea of a league of nations that could bring “an end to all hostilities.” Today The United Nations continues to pursue that dream, but lasting peace still seems to be wishful thinking.
Kant was a philosopher, not a practical politician, so it is a mistake to read Toward Lasting Peace as a proposal for political action. What is most important about this essay is its ability to probe the fundamental principles that shape relations among nations with specific attention to the dynamics of war and peace. As the world braces for a nuclear arms race that increasingly includes small nations and renews visions of global doom, it is important to recall the image of the graveyard with which Kant begins that essay. Today, more than ever, we face a choice: We can achieve a lasting peace within the human community through the rule of law, or we can produce peace by turning the entire world into a graveyard.
Forms of Government Kant agrees with Thomas Hobbes concerning the state of nature. Kant puts it this way:
The condition of people living next to each other is not naturally one of peace. The state of nature is a state of war. Even when this condition does not bring open hostilities, aggression is, nevertheless, a constant threat. Peace has to be established. An absence of hostilities does not provide the security of peace. Without gaining assurances from each other, which can only be accomplished by the rule of law, every neighbor who is threatened may treat another as an enemy (Immanuel Kant, Toward Lasting Peace, translated by Lieselotte Anderson, Agora Publications, Inc., 2006, 348-349).
Kant, like the social contract theorists, appeals to the rule of law to overcome the natural hostility among individuals. Unlike them, he realized that the nation state ruled by a leviathan, or even by a philosopher king, would only transfer the problem to another level. Today our most urgent challenge lies on that next level. How is it possible to end the threat of nations against each other? Kant is clear about the form government should take at the national level: “A republican system is the only one arising from the original contract among members of a human society” (349). What does Kant mean by a republican system? He says:
To avoid the common confusion between a republican constitution and a democratic constitution, [352] the following points must be considered. The difference in kinds of states can be identified either by the individual who incorporates the highest power in the state or by the type of government a people has by virtue of its leader, whoever that may be. The first kind gets its name from the form of rule that takes place. Only three kinds of ruling power are possible: rule by one single individual, rule by a few individuals who are joined together, or rule by all who constitute a civil society. In other words: autocracy, aristocracy, or democracy (the rule of princes, of nobility, or of commoners). The second kind of state gets its name from its form of government. It refers to the basis of the constitution, which is the common will of the people in action by which a group of persons becomes a people. The way the state uses its supreme power can be either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the kind of principle by which the executive power of government separates itself from the legislative power. Despotism is the arbitrary executive power to make idiosyncratic laws, which are proclaimed as the public will — provided they agree with the ruler’s personal will. Among the three types of states, democracy is, in the strictest sense of the word, necessarily despotism. It calls for an executive power by which everyone decides for or even against everyone else — including anyone who does not vote. This is a contradiction, not only between the general will and freedom, but also within the general will itself (Toward Lasting Peace, 351-352).
As with the word “freedom,” the term “democracy” is used in many different ways, some with contradictory meanings. It may at first sound strange to hear democracy described as “despotism,” but if we consider how Kant defines democracy, his analysis makes sense. To say that in democracy “everyone decides for or even against everyone else” is to think of democracy simply as “majority rule.” If that is how we define democracy, then it becomes clear why this is not the rule of law but a form of what John Stuart Mill called “the tyranny of the majority.” Mill cites the excesses that followed the French Revolution as examples of one kind of tyranny, but what is often called democracy easily becomes another kind. Mill’s words are worth repeating:
Elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms based upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrases as “self-government,” and “the power of the people over themselves,” do not express the true state of the case. The “people” who exercise the power are not always the same people as those over whom it is exercised; and the “self-government” spoken of is not the government of each alone, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people — the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority. The people may desire to oppress a part of their number, and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power (John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Edited by Lieselotte Anderson and Albert A. Anderson, Agora Publications, Inc., 2003, p. 4).
Socrates already made this important point about democracy long ago in Book Eight of Plato’s Republic. What he calls democracy is not the kind of government that was established in the U.S. in the 18th century. Representative government, especially with checks and balances among its different aspects, is quite different from a society in which liberty is the only value that matters.
Socrates: Democracy comes into being when the poor people have overthrown their rulers, killing some and sending others into exile. Those who remain are given an equal share of freedom and power, often electing the new leaders by lot.
Adeimantus: That is how democracy comes about, whether created by fighting or when the others surrender through fear.
Socrates: What kind of life do they lead? What sort of government is it?
Rather than thinking of freedom as autonomy — what Kant calls the application of law to oneself — this way of thinking about liberty takes it to mean doing whatever one pleases, the unrestrained pursuit of pleasures, desires, and interests. Kant, Mill, and Socrates all agree that this would be a danger rather than a benefit for a good human community.
Socrates: First of all, they would seem to be free. This kind of republic is free and open, one in which you can say and do whatever you please.
Adeimantus: That’s what they say.
Socrates: With all that choice, they have a full stock of constitutions. If someone wishes to create a republic, as we are doing now, it would be a good idea to visit a democracy as you might go to a bazaar and pick out one that suits you. Once you have made your choice, then you could use it as the foundation for your republic.
Adeimantus: You would definitely have a lot of samples to choose from.
Socrates: In such a republic you would not have to govern, even if you had the ability, nor would you have to be governed—unless you want to. You would not have to go to war when other people do or be at peace when others are at peace—unless you want to. You have the option to hold office or be a legislator, even if there is a law that forbids you to do so. Is this not a delightful way of life, at least for the moment?
Adeimantus: Yes it is—for the moment.
Socrates: Don’t you think it is charming how in such a republic convicted criminals remain calm, even if they have been condemned to death or exile, parading through the streets as if nobody saw or cared—like an invisible hero back from the dead?
Adeimantus: Yes, Socrates, we seem to see that more and more often (Plato’s Republic, Agora Publications, Inc., 2001, 557-558).
In direct opposition to all forms of tyranny and despotism, Kant is seeking a form of political organization where the rule of law can prevail. He insists that what he calls the “republican” form is the only reasonable choice for people who seek to preserve autonomy in politics. What distinguishes the republican form from the other kinds of government? “Republicanism is the kind of principle by which the executive power of government separates itself from the legislative power” (Toward Lasting Peace, 352). Here we find a fundamental principle that is also manifested in the U.S. Constitution.
The “separation of powers” articulated in The Federalist Papers is perhaps the most important element of the structure set up in the U.S. Constitution. Kant’s distinction between a republican and a democratic form of government is precisely the one made by James Madison in Federalist 10: “The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens and the greater sphere of country over which the latter may be extended” (The Federalist Papers, edited by Clinton Rossiter, Penguin Books. 1961, p. 82). In arguing for the Union, Madison says: “It clearly appears that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy in controlling the effects of faction is enjoyed by a large over a small republic — is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it” (The Federalist Papers, p. 83).
Separating the various powers in a government — especially the legislative, executive, and the judicial functions — is important because it alone is able to counteract the battle of factions that Madison cited as the chief downfall of governments. These factions are rooted in human nature, so any and every government must create a way of dealing with them. Madison says: “The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government” (The Federalist Papers, p. 79). Rather than trying to eliminate parties and factions, Madison advocates controlling and balancing them. To eliminate them would require eliminating human nature itself.
International Law Now we come to the central challenge in thinking about a world community. Even if we agree with Madison and Kant about the desirability of a republican form of government in the nation state, that does not answer the burning question of our times: How can we avoid chaos and regulate the diverse nations that increasingly threaten each other in our time? At first we might be tempted simply to extend the process that begins when individuals relinquish the liberty they have in the state of nature and adopt the rule of law by participating in a social contract. Why not create a world government analogous to the nation state? Kant explains why that solution is not possible, and he offers an alternative way of establishing international law. He says:
People, when formed into states, can be viewed as single individuals in a state of nature — and thus independent from external laws — who are endangered by their proximity to each other. For reasons of security, each state will and should demand from the others something like a civil contract to protect its rights. This would bring about a league of nations, but would still not constitute a single state composed of nations. A state of nations would be a contradiction, because a state must contain a relationship between a superior power that makes the laws and an inferior power, such as the people who obey. Many nations within a state would then comprise a single nation. To avoid contradiction, one must consider the rights of nations toward each other insofar as they constitute a certain number of states and are not to be melted into one state (Toward Lasting Peace, 354).
The ultimate objection to empire as a form of world government is that it would necessarily eliminate the sovereignty of all other states. Thomas Hobbes might have welcomed that solution, but Kant would not. Kant agreed with Hobbes about the need to abandon the state of nature and submit to the rule of law in civil society, but he rejected the despotic nature of the Leviathan. To accept Hobbes’ Leviathan is to embrace heteronomy, not autonomy, and that is as unwelcome in politics as it is in ethics.
As Kant explains, a necessary condition of having a single state is to have a sovereign power that makes the laws, and once that exists it would be impossible to have other sovereign states within it. If the individual states retain their sovereignty concerning the laws made by the world government, a contradiction arises that destroys the possibility of achieving such a government. A league of nations is not the same as a world government. The United Nations, created on October 24, 1945, is not a world government, although the statement of purpose in its charter shares some of the same objectives that we might expect from a governmental system for the entire world. The goal of the UN is
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, … to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, … to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.
This statement has great moral force, but it lacks the kind of sovereignty that is necessary for a political entity to be a state. This is why the UN is relatively impotent when it becomes necessary to enforce compliance with its declarations. The conflict in Iraq that began on March 19, 2003 is a clear example of this difficulty. A sovereign nation, such as the United States, is not legally obliged to act through the United Nations. The sovereign government of Sudan is not legally obliged to allow UN forces to enter its territory to try to quell the conflict in the Darfur region of that nation.
We must assess the viability of Kant’s proposal for what he calls “a peace alliance” in light of this current state of affairs.
What applies to people in a lawless state of nature, who can be required to overcome this condition, does not apply to states based on an external law of nature. As states, they already have an internal legal constitution that removes them from the coercion of others to accept an established concept of rights under a broader legal constitution. [356] For them, the power of human reason, the highest and mightiest form of moral and legal power, condemns war as a legal act and makes peace a non-negotiable duty. Such a peace cannot be made and secured without a contract among nations. There has to be an allegiance of a special kind — we might name it a peace alliance — that would differ from a peace treaty by its commitment to end not just one war but all wars — and to end them forever. This alliance would not seek to control the power of states but only to secure the freedom of a particular state for itself and simultaneously for all other states in the alliance. These states should not have to subject themselves to public laws and their enforcement, as would people in a state of nature. The implementation — the objective reality — of such federalism gradually includes all states and leads them to a lasting peace. With some luck, a mighty and enlightened people will transform itself into a republic — which by its very nature must be inclined toward lasting peace — and provide a core for the confederate alliance of other nations. By the encouragement to join and by the gradual spread of such alliances, it will secure a peaceful realization of the concept of natural coexistence (Toward Lasting Peace, 355-356).
Kant’s call for such a peace alliance is inspiring, and it has great moral appeal, but it faces the same dilemma as does the United Nations at this point in history. The UN seems to be the kind of “peace alliance” Kant proposed, but how can it enforce a ban on acquiring nuclear weapons by a sovereign nation such as Iran or North Korea?
The difficulty of implementing moral commands in the actual world is not limited to the realm of war and peace. Consider a threat from another domain. A recent study by Frank Ackerman, an economist from Tufts University, predicts that by the year 2100 the effects of climate change could raise the global temperature 3.5 degrees Celsius. Ackerman says that could cost as much as 20 trillion dollars per year (WBUR, October 14, 2006). A sovereign nation like the United States can refuse to sign international agreements to curb such climate change, saying it would be bad for the nation’s economy. The world community seems to be powerless to influence such decisions. On December 10, 1948 the UN General Assembly adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is another lofty statement with great moral appeal, but the United States has not yet endorsed it.
We seem to have reached an impasse. As desirable as a world community might be, as urgent as a lasting peace is for the very survival of the human race, as long as sovereignty is located in nation states there seems to be no way to achieve those goals. In another short political essay that was written in 1784, Kant examined what he called the “idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose.” This cosmopolitan idea goes back as far as the ancient Stoics. Perhaps the way out of the dilemma we have encountered concerning the implementation of the moral and political vision established during the Enlightenment is to look beyond the nation state and seek a solution to this dilemma that was generated by modernism. In my next podcast I will open the discussion of a cosmopolitan world community for the postmodern age.
Podcast #6: The Dilemma of Nationalism in the Modern World
In Podcast #5 I outlined Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory and asked the following question: Does Kant provide the political foundation on which a world community might be conceived? Kant did not write a major work on social and political philosophy, but his works on ethics and some of his short essays provide helpful ideas about the nature of community and its philosophical foundations. Some scholars think Kant’s political philosophy has been seriously underestimated. For example, Professor Hans Reiss of the University of Bristol says: “Kant should be accorded a prominent place in the history of Western political thought, a place which has far too long been denied him. He ought to be ranked among the leading political thinkers of all time. Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes are his peers. He is second to none in acuteness of his thinking.” (Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 39). Instead of a major work on politics, Kant wrote several shorter essays on that topic. For example, he published an essay in 1795 called Toward Lasting Peace. The high hopes of the Enlightenment that gave rise to the American and the French Revolutions had been dampened by the Reign of Terror in which tens of thousands of people died. The perpetual vacillation between war and temporary armistice seemed to be inescapable. In thinking about the possibility of bringing an end to that vicious cycle, Kant laid the foundations for a kind of community that might provide an alternative to imperialism and colonialism. Kant’s essay is best known as an early articulation of the idea of a league of nations that could bring “an end to all hostilities.” Today The United Nations continues to pursue that dream, but lasting peace still seems to be wishful thinking.
Kant was a philosopher, not a practical politician, so it is a mistake to read Toward Lasting Peace as a proposal for political action. What is most important about this essay is its ability to probe the fundamental principles that shape relations among nations with specific attention to the dynamics of war and peace. As the world braces for a nuclear arms race that increasingly includes small nations and renews visions of global doom, it is important to recall the image of the graveyard with which Kant begins that essay. Today, more than ever, we face a choice: We can achieve a lasting peace within the human community through the rule of law, or we can produce peace by turning the entire world into a graveyard.
Forms of Government Kant agrees with Thomas Hobbes concerning the state of nature. Kant puts it this way:
The condition of people living next to each other is not naturally one of peace. The state of nature is a state of war. Even when this condition does not bring open hostilities, aggression is, nevertheless, a constant threat. Peace has to be established. An absence of hostilities does not provide the security of peace. Without gaining assurances from each other, which can only be accomplished by the rule of law, every neighbor who is threatened may treat another as an enemy (Immanuel Kant, Toward Lasting Peace, translated by Lieselotte Anderson, Agora Publications, Inc., 2006, 348-349).
Kant, like the social contract theorists, appeals to the rule of law to overcome the natural hostility among individuals. Unlike them, he realized that the nation state ruled by a leviathan, or even by a philosopher king, would only transfer the problem to another level. Today our most urgent challenge lies on that next level. How is it possible to end the threat of nations against each other? Kant is clear about the form government should take at the national level: “A republican system is the only one arising from the original contract among members of a human society” (349). What does Kant mean by a republican system? He says:
To avoid the common confusion between a republican constitution and a democratic constitution, [352] the following points must be considered. The difference in kinds of states can be identified either by the individual who incorporates the highest power in the state or by the type of government a people has by virtue of its leader, whoever that may be. The first kind gets its name from the form of rule that takes place. Only three kinds of ruling power are possible: rule by one single individual, rule by a few individuals who are joined together, or rule by all who constitute a civil society. In other words: autocracy, aristocracy, or democracy (the rule of princes, of nobility, or of commoners). The second kind of state gets its name from its form of government. It refers to the basis of the constitution, which is the common will of the people in action by which a group of persons becomes a people. The way the state uses its supreme power can be either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the kind of principle by which the executive power of government separates itself from the legislative power. Despotism is the arbitrary executive power to make idiosyncratic laws, which are proclaimed as the public will — provided they agree with the ruler’s personal will. Among the three types of states, democracy is, in the strictest sense of the word, necessarily despotism. It calls for an executive power by which everyone decides for or even against everyone else — including anyone who does not vote. This is a contradiction, not only between the general will and freedom, but also within the general will itself (Toward Lasting Peace, 351-352).
As with the word “freedom,” the term “democracy” is used in many different ways, some with contradictory meanings. It may at first sound strange to hear democracy described as “despotism,” but if we consider how Kant defines democracy, his analysis makes sense. To say that in democracy “everyone decides for or even against everyone else” is to think of democracy simply as “majority rule.” If that is how we define democracy, then it becomes clear why this is not the rule of law but a form of what John Stuart Mill called “the tyranny of the majority.” Mill cites the excesses that followed the French Revolution as examples of one kind of tyranny, but what is often called democracy easily becomes another kind. Mill’s words are worth repeating:
Elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms based upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrases as “self-government,” and “the power of the people over themselves,” do not express the true state of the case. The “people” who exercise the power are not always the same people as those over whom it is exercised; and the “self-government” spoken of is not the government of each alone, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people — the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority. The people may desire to oppress a part of their number, and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power (John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Edited by Lieselotte Anderson and Albert A. Anderson, Agora Publications, Inc., 2003, p. 4).
Socrates already made this important point about democracy long ago in Book Eight of Plato’s Republic. What he calls democracy is not the kind of government that was established in the U.S. in the 18th century. Representative government, especially with checks and balances among its different aspects, is quite different from a society in which liberty is the only value that matters.
Socrates: Democracy comes into being when the poor people have overthrown their rulers, killing some and sending others into exile. Those who remain are given an equal share of freedom and power, often electing the new leaders by lot.
Adeimantus: That is how democracy comes about, whether created by fighting or when the others surrender through fear.
Socrates: What kind of life do they lead? What sort of government is it?
Rather than thinking of freedom as autonomy — what Kant calls the application of law to oneself — this way of thinking about liberty takes it to mean doing whatever one pleases, the unrestrained pursuit of pleasures, desires, and interests. Kant, Mill, and Socrates all agree that this would be a danger rather than a benefit for a good human community.
Socrates: First of all, they would seem to be free. This kind of republic is free and open, one in which you can say and do whatever you please.
Adeimantus: That’s what they say.
Socrates: With all that choice, they have a full stock of constitutions. If someone wishes to create a republic, as we are doing now, it would be a good idea to visit a democracy as you might go to a bazaar and pick out one that suits you. Once you have made your choice, then you could use it as the foundation for your republic.
Adeimantus: You would definitely have a lot of samples to choose from.
Socrates: In such a republic you would not have to govern, even if you had the ability, nor would you have to be governed—unless you want to. You would not have to go to war when other people do or be at peace when others are at peace—unless you want to. You have the option to hold office or be a legislator, even if there is a law that forbids you to do so. Is this not a delightful way of life, at least for the moment?
Adeimantus: Yes it is—for the moment.
Socrates: Don’t you think it is charming how in such a republic convicted criminals remain calm, even if they have been condemned to death or exile, parading through the streets as if nobody saw or cared—like an invisible hero back from the dead?
Adeimantus: Yes, Socrates, we seem to see that more and more often (Plato’s Republic, Agora Publications, Inc., 2001, 557-558).
In direct opposition to all forms of tyranny and despotism, Kant is seeking a form of political organization where the rule of law can prevail. He insists that what he calls the “republican” form is the only reasonable choice for people who seek to preserve autonomy in politics. What distinguishes the republican form from the other kinds of government? “Republicanism is the kind of principle by which the executive power of government separates itself from the legislative power” (Toward Lasting Peace, 352). Here we find a fundamental principle that is also manifested in the U.S. Constitution.
The “separation of powers” articulated in The Federalist Papers is perhaps the most important element of the structure set up in the U.S. Constitution. Kant’s distinction between a republican and a democratic form of government is precisely the one made by James Madison in Federalist 10: “The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens and the greater sphere of country over which the latter may be extended” (The Federalist Papers, edited by Clinton Rossiter, Penguin Books. 1961, p. 82). In arguing for the Union, Madison says: “It clearly appears that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy in controlling the effects of faction is enjoyed by a large over a small republic — is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it” (The Federalist Papers, p. 83).
Separating the various powers in a government — especially the legislative, executive, and the judicial functions — is important because it alone is able to counteract the battle of factions that Madison cited as the chief downfall of governments. These factions are rooted in human nature, so any and every government must create a way of dealing with them. Madison says: “The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government” (The Federalist Papers, p. 79). Rather than trying to eliminate parties and factions, Madison advocates controlling and balancing them. To eliminate them would require eliminating human nature itself.
International Law Now we come to the central challenge in thinking about a world community. Even if we agree with Madison and Kant about the desirability of a republican form of government in the nation state, that does not answer the burning question of our times: How can we avoid chaos and regulate the diverse nations that increasingly threaten each other in our time? At first we might be tempted simply to extend the process that begins when individuals relinquish the liberty they have in the state of nature and adopt the rule of law by participating in a social contract. Why not create a world government analogous to the nation state? Kant explains why that solution is not possible, and he offers an alternative way of establishing international law. He says:
People, when formed into states, can be viewed as single individuals in a state of nature — and thus independent from external laws — who are endangered by their proximity to each other. For reasons of security, each state will and should demand from the others something like a civil contract to protect its rights. This would bring about a league of nations, but would still not constitute a single state composed of nations. A state of nations would be a contradiction, because a state must contain a relationship between a superior power that makes the laws and an inferior power, such as the people who obey. Many nations within a state would then comprise a single nation. To avoid contradiction, one must consider the rights of nations toward each other insofar as they constitute a certain number of states and are not to be melted into one state (Toward Lasting Peace, 354).
The ultimate objection to empire as a form of world government is that it would necessarily eliminate the sovereignty of all other states. Thomas Hobbes might have welcomed that solution, but Kant would not. Kant agreed with Hobbes about the need to abandon the state of nature and submit to the rule of law in civil society, but he rejected the despotic nature of the Leviathan. To accept Hobbes’ Leviathan is to embrace heteronomy, not autonomy, and that is as unwelcome in politics as it is in ethics.
As Kant explains, a necessary condition of having a single state is to have a sovereign power that makes the laws, and once that exists it would be impossible to have other sovereign states within it. If the individual states retain their sovereignty concerning the laws made by the world government, a contradiction arises that destroys the possibility of achieving such a government. A league of nations is not the same as a world government. The United Nations, created on October 24, 1945, is not a world government, although the statement of purpose in its charter shares some of the same objectives that we might expect from a governmental system for the entire world. The goal of the UN is
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, … to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, … to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.
This statement has great moral force, but it lacks the kind of sovereignty that is necessary for a political entity to be a state. This is why the UN is relatively impotent when it becomes necessary to enforce compliance with its declarations. The conflict in Iraq that began on March 19, 2003 is a clear example of this difficulty. A sovereign nation, such as the United States, is not legally obliged to act through the United Nations. The sovereign government of Sudan is not legally obliged to allow UN forces to enter its territory to try to quell the conflict in the Darfur region of that nation.
We must assess the viability of Kant’s proposal for what he calls “a peace alliance” in light of this current state of affairs.
What applies to people in a lawless state of nature, who can be required to overcome this condition, does not apply to states based on an external law of nature. As states, they already have an internal legal constitution that removes them from the coercion of others to accept an established concept of rights under a broader legal constitution. [356] For them, the power of human reason, the highest and mightiest form of moral and legal power, condemns war as a legal act and makes peace a non-negotiable duty. Such a peace cannot be made and secured without a contract among nations. There has to be an allegiance of a special kind — we might name it a peace alliance — that would differ from a peace treaty by its commitment to end not just one war but all wars — and to end them forever. This alliance would not seek to control the power of states but only to secure the freedom of a particular state for itself and simultaneously for all other states in the alliance. These states should not have to subject themselves to public laws and their enforcement, as would people in a state of nature. The implementation — the objective reality — of such federalism gradually includes all states and leads them to a lasting peace. With some luck, a mighty and enlightened people will transform itself into a republic — which by its very nature must be inclined toward lasting peace — and provide a core for the confederate alliance of other nations. By the encouragement to join and by the gradual spread of such alliances, it will secure a peaceful realization of the concept of natural coexistence (Toward Lasting Peace, 355-356).
Kant’s call for such a peace alliance is inspiring, and it has great moral appeal, but it faces the same dilemma as does the United Nations at this point in history. The UN seems to be the kind of “peace alliance” Kant proposed, but how can it enforce a ban on acquiring nuclear weapons by a sovereign nation such as Iran or North Korea?
The difficulty of implementing moral commands in the actual world is not limited to the realm of war and peace. Consider a threat from another domain. A recent study by Frank Ackerman, an economist from Tufts University, predicts that by the year 2100 the effects of climate change could raise the global temperature 3.5 degrees Celsius. Ackerman says that could cost as much as 20 trillion dollars per year (WBUR, October 14, 2006). A sovereign nation like the United States can refuse to sign international agreements to curb such climate change, saying it would be bad for the nation’s economy. The world community seems to be powerless to influence such decisions. On December 10, 1948 the UN General Assembly adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is another lofty statement with great moral appeal, but the United States has not yet endorsed it.
We seem to have reached an impasse. As desirable as a world community might be, as urgent as a lasting peace is for the very survival of the human race, as long as sovereignty is located in nation states there seems to be no way to achieve those goals. In another short political essay that was written in 1784, Kant examined what he called the “idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose.” This cosmopolitan idea goes back as far as the ancient Stoics. Perhaps the way out of the dilemma we have encountered concerning the implementation of the moral and political vision established during the Enlightenment is to look beyond the nation state and seek a solution to this dilemma that was generated by modernism. In my next podcast I will open the discussion of a cosmopolitan world community for the postmodern age.