Human Nature
Podcastä # 8: Manifesting Mind
Albert A. Anderson
Copyright 2006
Personal Immortality
The view of the soul presented in the first half of Plato’s Phaedo is the starting-point of a dialectical examination of human nature. This analysis focuses on the person of Socrates, an individual human being. The primary question about that argument is whether or not it is logically sound. Socrates clearly states that he has been recounting “an ancient myth.” That myth comes from the Orphic tradition, one of the early Greek mystery religions. We must use philosophical analysis if we are to justify its claim that individual souls existed prior to taking up residence in a human body. Here is a crucial exchange between Socrates and Cebes:
Cebes: Socrates, what you said was beautifully phrased, and I agree with you; but people will doubt what you said about the soul. [70] They fear that when the soul leaves the body it might be nowhere. On the day we die, it might be destroyed and cease to exist. Once it is released from the body, it might dissipate like smoke or breath and vanish into nothingness. If the soul could hold together and exist by itself after being released from the ills of the body, as you just recounted, there would be good reason to hope that what you say is true. But considerable persuasion and many arguments are needed to prove that when a person dies, the soul continues to exist and retains power and mind.
Socrates: Cebes, what you say is true, but how should we proceed? Would you like to talk about the probability of such things?
Cebes: Yes, certainly. I would like to hear your opinion.
Socrates: Well, I suppose anyone who heard me just now — even a comic poet — could not accuse me of idly talking about matters that do not concern me. So, if you all agree, let us examine the matter carefully. The question is whether or not the souls of people who have died are in Hades. The ancient myth I have been recounting says that souls go from here to there and then return, being born again from the dead. If this is true, then the living come from the dead, so our souls must exist there. Otherwise, how could they be born again? This would be conclusive if we could establish that those who are living are only born from the dead. But if this cannot be proved, some other arguments will have to be found.
Cebes: That’s true.
Socrates: We should consider this matter not only in relation to human beings but also as it relates to other animals and to plants — to everything that is generated. Can we say that everything that has an opposite is generated out of its opposite? Consider the beautiful and the ugly, the just and the unjust, and all kinds of other opposites. Is this always the case, just as something larger becomes larger after having been smaller?
Cebes: That does seem to be how it is.
Socrates: And was what is smaller was once larger before it became smaller? [71]
Cebes: Yes.
Socrates: Is the weaker generated from the stronger, and the faster from the slower?
Cebes: That’s right.
Socrates: Does the worse come from the better, and the just come from the unjust?
Cebes: Certainly.
Socrates: Is this true of all opposites? Are we convinced that all of them are generated out of their opposites?
Cebes: Yes. (Plato’s Phaedo, Agora Publications, 2005, Greek page 70).
This argument, generally referred to as the “argument from opposites,” is flawed. It commits the logical fallacy called equivocation. It rests on the general principle that says all things are generated out of their opposites. But this can mean that individual things (such as the person Socrates) go from opposite state to opposite state, such as from not being alive to being alive. Or it might also mean that in some process opposite qualities are manifested (not being alive vs. being alive). The distinction between things and qualities becomes explicit later in the dialogue.
Phaedo: At this point, one of the listeners — I cannot remember who — jumped into the conversation and exclaimed that what had just been said is the exact opposite of what was argued earlier: The smaller comes out of the larger, and the larger comes out of the smaller. In other words, opposites are generated from opposites. Now we are saying this could never happen! Socrates turned his head to the speaker and listened. Then he replied.
Socrates: I applaud your courage in reminding us of this. However, I don’t think you understand the difference between what we said then and what we are saying now. What we were discussing before was the generation of specific things from their opposites, but now we are dealing with essences, which can never become their opposite, neither in nature nor in us. My friend, at that point we were talking about individual things that have opposite qualities and which get their names from those qualities, but now we are talking about the opposite qualities themselves which provide the names of things and which can never be generated from each other (Plato’s Phaedo, Agora Publications, 2005, Greek page 102).
At what point can we rightly say that an individual person exists as a person? None of the arguments presented in Phaedo justifies the claim that an individual person named Socrates existed before Socrates was born. What does it mean to be a person? There are a number of unclear and implicit assumptions in the “argument from opposites” that need to be clarified and justified before this argument can be judged to be sound. For the same reason, none of the arguments presented in the Phaedo justifies the claim that an individual person named Socrates will continue to exist after his body dies. Belief in the immortality of individual souls is an article of faith in Orphic religion. But rational proof for personal immortality simply has not been given.
The second argument, “the argument from recollection,” is also fallacious, because it also commits the fallacy of equivocation. Cebes, a latter-day Pythagorean, introduces that argument:
Cebes: Socrates, if the maxim you often cited is true, that “learning is recollection,” that implies a previous time in which we learned what we now recollect. That would be impossible unless the soul were somewhere before existing in human form. So, this is another proof that the soul is immortal (Plato’s Phaedo, Agora Publications, 2005, Greek page 73).
The argument does not prove that the personal soul (psyche) existed in human form. It could be that the ideas that we recollect belong to a universal mind (nous) to which we all have access. Our ideas do not spring into existence “from nothing.” Metaphorically speaking, we “recollect” ideas that existed before we were born. Without ideas of that sort thinking, language, and interpersonal communication would be impossible. All humans have access to those ideas (ta eide), That is the realm of the mind that is established by the third argument presented in Plato’s Phaedo. But it has not been established that individual souls named Socrates, Simmias, or Cebes existed before their bodies were born or that they will exist as autonomous beings after their bodies die. The fallacy committed by this “argument from recollection” lies in the equivocation between an individual, autonomous person (psyche) having an idea and the existence of that idea in an universal mind (nous) shared with other persons.
Mind as Immortal
The central argument in Plato’s Phaedo pertains to the idea of mind. Socrates recalls how excited he was when he heard that Anaxagoras had written a book explaining the concept of mind (nous) and its role in shaping human nature. Her immediately bought that book and read it.
Cebes, my friend, this wonderful hope soon flew away and disappeared. As I proceeded, I found that the man did not attribute to mind any genuine role in organizing things but appealed to air, ether, water, and many other strange things as the real causes. It was as if someone said that Socrates’ does everything he does with his mind, but when asked to explain any particular action — such as why I am currently sitting here in prison — responded by saying that I am sitting here because my body is made up of bones and tendons, that the bones are hard and have ligaments that connect them, that the tendons are elastic and cover the bones, which also are covered by flesh and skin. As the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, it is possible to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here with my legs bent. That is what he would say, and he would explain my talking to you in a similar way. [99] He would attribute that to sound and air and hearing, and he would list ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is that the Athenians thought it best to condemn me, and I thought it is best to sit here and it is right to endure the penalty they imposed. By the dog of Egypt, I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off to Megara or Boeotia long ago, guided by the idea of what is best, if I had not decided that it is better and nobler to accept the sentence inflicted by the state rather than escape and run away.
It is absurd to call such things causes, but it would be right to say that without bones and tendons and other parts of my body I could not carry out my decisions. But to say that those are the causes of what I am doing — that I’m doing it with reason but not by choosing what is best — is an extremely careless and sloppy way of talking. Imagine being unable to distinguish between the true cause and a condition without which it could not act (Plato’s Phaedo, Agora Publications, 2005, Greek pages 98-99).
Anaxagoras failed to satisfy Socrates’ quest for an answer to the basic question about what is real and able to account for our most basic choices in life. He provided an account of the material basis of human action, but he failed to explain the reasons why a person chooses one path or another. Why is Socrates sitting in prison ready to be executed? Because he had arrived at the conclusion that it was right and just for him to be there. The reasons for that judgment are provided in the dialogue called Crito.
The idea of justice and Socrates’ commitment to avoiding injustice exemplify the kind of fundamental principles that constitute a philosophical life. Our study of human nature began with the contemporary emphasis on physical, biological, and cybernetic phenomena. In the Phaedo we encounter a much more compelling set of qualities that are essential for human existence. Mind and ideas provide what is most important for a human life. The central dogma of scientific empiricism holds that only what can be observed through sense experience can be accepted as true or real. Essential features of human activity such as mind and ideas cannot be observed through sense experience. But without an idea such as justice it is impossible to explain why Socrates is in prison waiting to die rather than enjoying a good meal with Crito’s friends in Thessaly.
Human nature cannot be understood apart from the broader natural context the ancient Greeks called the cosmos. Presocratic thinkers such as Anaxagoras thought they could explain the cosmos — and the human beings who inhabit it — in strictly material terms. They thought that air, earth, fire, and water were sufficient to account for that material reality. In addition, they tried to identify causal factors that would explain change and movement. This is similar to contemporary explanations that try to account for mind and ideas in terms of evolutionary biology or computer technology. But those sciences are insufficient to explain what matters most in human life.
The explanation of ideas and mind introduced in Plato’s Phaedo is incomplete. Other Platonic dialogues elaborate and expand on that way of thinking about human beings and about the broader world of which we are a part. But the vision in the Phaedo shows what must be included in any satisfactory account of human nature. Mind and ideas transcend individual and isolated human brains. This does not mean that brains are unimportant. The Orphic/Pythagorean mythology that imagines souls hopping from brain to brain has no solid rational support, and it is left behind when the dialectic moves to a more satisfactory account of human existence in terms of mind and ideas. Human bodies and the brains they contain manifest ideas. It is precisely those ideas that make genuine science possible. The Human Genome project, Darwin’s theory of evolution, computer science, Newton’s laws of motion, Einstein’s account of relativity, and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle are examples of such ideas. But those ideas are not limited to the brains of Newton, Darwin, Einstein, or Heisenberg. They are at home in the realm of the mind, which is an essential part of the cosmos. Mind is not, as some Platonists have suggested, a separate world or another reality that lies outside of our universe. Plato’s dialogues provide devastating arguments against that kind of dualism. Mind and ideas are necessary to explain human nature and the nature of the world we inhabit.
Is mind immortal? Unlike individual bodies and their brains, mind and the ideas it manifests do not die when individuals die. Newton’s laws still exist even thought Newton’s body long ago became food for worms. Darwin’s ideas about natural selection continue to thrive in the life of the mind in the 21st century. Socrates’ method of thinking is as vital today as it was in Plato’s Academy. In that sense, mind is immortal. I think that is what Plato was trying to show us in the dialectical development of the Phaedo and his other dialogues on this topic. Plato’s account of Socrates’ final hours is about life, not about death.
Socrates: Then answer this question: What is in a body that makes it live?
Cebes: Soul.
Socrates: Is this always true?
Cebes: Yes.
Socrates: Then whatever soul occupies, it always brings it to life.
Cebes: It does.
Socrates: What is the opposite of life?
Cebes: Death.
Socrates: Based on what we have established earlier, is it safe to say soul will never admit the opposite of what it brings?
Cebes: It is safe to say so.
Socrates: What did we call the idea that does not admit the form of the even?
Cebes: The odd.
Socrates: What about the forms that repel the musical and the just?
Cebes: The unmusical and the unjust.
Socrates: Well, then, what do we call the form that does not admit death?
Cebes: Immortal.
Socrates: Does soul admit death?
Cebes: No.
Socrates: Then soul is immortal.
Cebes: Yes.
Socrates: Cebes, may we say that we have proved that this is so?
Cebes: Yes, Socrates, we have proved it decisively (Plato’s Phaedo, Agora Publications, 2005, Greek page 105).
In this passage Socrates is talking not about the Orphic/Pythagorean soul as it was discussed in the first part of the dialogue but about the living mind that accounts for the order of the cosmos. This applies to the motions of the planets and the stars as well as the civic order required to allow human beings to live in cities.
Even though many people have appealed to Plato’s dialogues for insight about what they considered to be divine, the dialectical process manifested in those dialogues admits and supports only what can be justified by rational analysis and sound argument. That is the method Socrates specifically endorsed in Phaedo.
Socrates: As I continued my search, I thought that I should be careful not to blind my mind’s eye the way some people ruin their bodily eyes by looking directly at the sun during an eclipse, rather than looking at an image of the sun reflected in water or a similar material. I was afraid that my soul might be blinded if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to grasp them with any of my other senses alone. I thought it would be necessary to appeal to reasoning [100] when seeking reality and truth. But perhaps that comparison is not quite right, since I would not say that people who contemplate reality by reasoning are merely working with images. At any rate, this is how I proceed in every inquiry. First I select the account of the matter that seems to be the strongest, and then I consider whatever agrees with it to be true — whether it concerns causality or anything else. Whatever disagrees with that account I assume to be false. Maybe I should explain what I mean more clearly, because I’m not sure you understand what I am saying.
Cebes: No, Socrates, I definitely do not understand.
Socrates: What I am about to say is not new. It is what I was saying earlier in this conversation and what I say always and everywhere. In trying to explain the nature of causality, I will return to those familiar ideas and begin there. First I assume the existence of beauty itself, goodness itself, greatness itself, and other such forms. If you will grant that, then I hope to show you the nature of causality and that soul is immortal.
Cebes: I do grant that, so please go ahead.
Socrates: Then consider my next step and see whether you think it is a good one. I think that if anything is beautiful other than beauty itself, then it can only be beautiful because it takes part in beauty itself. And I would say the same of everything else. Do you agree with this idea of causality?
Cebes: I do agree.
Socrates: I simply do not understand those clever causes the others have proposed. If someone tells me that bright color or a certain shape makes something beautiful, I ignore such explanations, because they confuse me. I simply and perhaps naively hold with confidence the view that nothing makes anything beautiful other than the presence or participation of beauty itself, in whatever way that comes about. I do not pretend to know how it happens, but I am confident that it is beauty that makes all beautiful things beautiful. That seems to be the most reliable answer I can give to myself and to others. As long as I hold to it, I am confident I will remain firm and secure. I think it is safe for me and everyone else to answer that it is by beauty that beautiful things become beautiful. Will you agree with that (Plato’s Phaedo, Agora Publications, 2005, Greek page s 99-100)?
Cebes: I will.
Human Nature in the 21st Century
The interpretation of Plato’s worldview I have been developing is a long way from the dualism of the Orphic/Pythagorean tradition that was popular during Plato’s day. Plato’s dialectical way of thinking would embrace the natural sciences, but it would also incorporate politics, ethics, and the creative arts. Only through a comprehensive approach that incorporates what is best in human beings is it possible to account for human nature.
The next mindcastä in this series on human nature will examine a recent film for which a contemporary physicist and his bother wrote the script. The physicist is Fritjof Capra. He drew upon his book The Turning Point and collaborated with his brother, filmmaker Bernt Capra, to make the film MindWalk. That film suggests the outline of a contemporary way of thinking about human nature that blends science, politics, and art.
Podcastä # 8: Manifesting Mind
Albert A. Anderson
Copyright 2006
Personal Immortality
The view of the soul presented in the first half of Plato’s Phaedo is the starting-point of a dialectical examination of human nature. This analysis focuses on the person of Socrates, an individual human being. The primary question about that argument is whether or not it is logically sound. Socrates clearly states that he has been recounting “an ancient myth.” That myth comes from the Orphic tradition, one of the early Greek mystery religions. We must use philosophical analysis if we are to justify its claim that individual souls existed prior to taking up residence in a human body. Here is a crucial exchange between Socrates and Cebes:
Cebes: Socrates, what you said was beautifully phrased, and I agree with you; but people will doubt what you said about the soul. [70] They fear that when the soul leaves the body it might be nowhere. On the day we die, it might be destroyed and cease to exist. Once it is released from the body, it might dissipate like smoke or breath and vanish into nothingness. If the soul could hold together and exist by itself after being released from the ills of the body, as you just recounted, there would be good reason to hope that what you say is true. But considerable persuasion and many arguments are needed to prove that when a person dies, the soul continues to exist and retains power and mind.
Socrates: Cebes, what you say is true, but how should we proceed? Would you like to talk about the probability of such things?
Cebes: Yes, certainly. I would like to hear your opinion.
Socrates: Well, I suppose anyone who heard me just now — even a comic poet — could not accuse me of idly talking about matters that do not concern me. So, if you all agree, let us examine the matter carefully. The question is whether or not the souls of people who have died are in Hades. The ancient myth I have been recounting says that souls go from here to there and then return, being born again from the dead. If this is true, then the living come from the dead, so our souls must exist there. Otherwise, how could they be born again? This would be conclusive if we could establish that those who are living are only born from the dead. But if this cannot be proved, some other arguments will have to be found.
Cebes: That’s true.
Socrates: We should consider this matter not only in relation to human beings but also as it relates to other animals and to plants — to everything that is generated. Can we say that everything that has an opposite is generated out of its opposite? Consider the beautiful and the ugly, the just and the unjust, and all kinds of other opposites. Is this always the case, just as something larger becomes larger after having been smaller?
Cebes: That does seem to be how it is.
Socrates: And was what is smaller was once larger before it became smaller? [71]
Cebes: Yes.
Socrates: Is the weaker generated from the stronger, and the faster from the slower?
Cebes: That’s right.
Socrates: Does the worse come from the better, and the just come from the unjust?
Cebes: Certainly.
Socrates: Is this true of all opposites? Are we convinced that all of them are generated out of their opposites?
Cebes: Yes. (Plato’s Phaedo, Agora Publications, 2005, Greek page 70).
This argument, generally referred to as the “argument from opposites,” is flawed. It commits the logical fallacy called equivocation. It rests on the general principle that says all things are generated out of their opposites. But this can mean that individual things (such as the person Socrates) go from opposite state to opposite state, such as from not being alive to being alive. Or it might also mean that in some process opposite qualities are manifested (not being alive vs. being alive). The distinction between things and qualities becomes explicit later in the dialogue.
Phaedo: At this point, one of the listeners — I cannot remember who — jumped into the conversation and exclaimed that what had just been said is the exact opposite of what was argued earlier: The smaller comes out of the larger, and the larger comes out of the smaller. In other words, opposites are generated from opposites. Now we are saying this could never happen! Socrates turned his head to the speaker and listened. Then he replied.
Socrates: I applaud your courage in reminding us of this. However, I don’t think you understand the difference between what we said then and what we are saying now. What we were discussing before was the generation of specific things from their opposites, but now we are dealing with essences, which can never become their opposite, neither in nature nor in us. My friend, at that point we were talking about individual things that have opposite qualities and which get their names from those qualities, but now we are talking about the opposite qualities themselves which provide the names of things and which can never be generated from each other (Plato’s Phaedo, Agora Publications, 2005, Greek page 102).
At what point can we rightly say that an individual person exists as a person? None of the arguments presented in Phaedo justifies the claim that an individual person named Socrates existed before Socrates was born. What does it mean to be a person? There are a number of unclear and implicit assumptions in the “argument from opposites” that need to be clarified and justified before this argument can be judged to be sound. For the same reason, none of the arguments presented in the Phaedo justifies the claim that an individual person named Socrates will continue to exist after his body dies. Belief in the immortality of individual souls is an article of faith in Orphic religion. But rational proof for personal immortality simply has not been given.
The second argument, “the argument from recollection,” is also fallacious, because it also commits the fallacy of equivocation. Cebes, a latter-day Pythagorean, introduces that argument:
Cebes: Socrates, if the maxim you often cited is true, that “learning is recollection,” that implies a previous time in which we learned what we now recollect. That would be impossible unless the soul were somewhere before existing in human form. So, this is another proof that the soul is immortal (Plato’s Phaedo, Agora Publications, 2005, Greek page 73).
The argument does not prove that the personal soul (psyche) existed in human form. It could be that the ideas that we recollect belong to a universal mind (nous) to which we all have access. Our ideas do not spring into existence “from nothing.” Metaphorically speaking, we “recollect” ideas that existed before we were born. Without ideas of that sort thinking, language, and interpersonal communication would be impossible. All humans have access to those ideas (ta eide), That is the realm of the mind that is established by the third argument presented in Plato’s Phaedo. But it has not been established that individual souls named Socrates, Simmias, or Cebes existed before their bodies were born or that they will exist as autonomous beings after their bodies die. The fallacy committed by this “argument from recollection” lies in the equivocation between an individual, autonomous person (psyche) having an idea and the existence of that idea in an universal mind (nous) shared with other persons.
Mind as Immortal
The central argument in Plato’s Phaedo pertains to the idea of mind. Socrates recalls how excited he was when he heard that Anaxagoras had written a book explaining the concept of mind (nous) and its role in shaping human nature. Her immediately bought that book and read it.
Cebes, my friend, this wonderful hope soon flew away and disappeared. As I proceeded, I found that the man did not attribute to mind any genuine role in organizing things but appealed to air, ether, water, and many other strange things as the real causes. It was as if someone said that Socrates’ does everything he does with his mind, but when asked to explain any particular action — such as why I am currently sitting here in prison — responded by saying that I am sitting here because my body is made up of bones and tendons, that the bones are hard and have ligaments that connect them, that the tendons are elastic and cover the bones, which also are covered by flesh and skin. As the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, it is possible to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here with my legs bent. That is what he would say, and he would explain my talking to you in a similar way. [99] He would attribute that to sound and air and hearing, and he would list ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is that the Athenians thought it best to condemn me, and I thought it is best to sit here and it is right to endure the penalty they imposed. By the dog of Egypt, I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off to Megara or Boeotia long ago, guided by the idea of what is best, if I had not decided that it is better and nobler to accept the sentence inflicted by the state rather than escape and run away.
It is absurd to call such things causes, but it would be right to say that without bones and tendons and other parts of my body I could not carry out my decisions. But to say that those are the causes of what I am doing — that I’m doing it with reason but not by choosing what is best — is an extremely careless and sloppy way of talking. Imagine being unable to distinguish between the true cause and a condition without which it could not act (Plato’s Phaedo, Agora Publications, 2005, Greek pages 98-99).
Anaxagoras failed to satisfy Socrates’ quest for an answer to the basic question about what is real and able to account for our most basic choices in life. He provided an account of the material basis of human action, but he failed to explain the reasons why a person chooses one path or another. Why is Socrates sitting in prison ready to be executed? Because he had arrived at the conclusion that it was right and just for him to be there. The reasons for that judgment are provided in the dialogue called Crito.
The idea of justice and Socrates’ commitment to avoiding injustice exemplify the kind of fundamental principles that constitute a philosophical life. Our study of human nature began with the contemporary emphasis on physical, biological, and cybernetic phenomena. In the Phaedo we encounter a much more compelling set of qualities that are essential for human existence. Mind and ideas provide what is most important for a human life. The central dogma of scientific empiricism holds that only what can be observed through sense experience can be accepted as true or real. Essential features of human activity such as mind and ideas cannot be observed through sense experience. But without an idea such as justice it is impossible to explain why Socrates is in prison waiting to die rather than enjoying a good meal with Crito’s friends in Thessaly.
Human nature cannot be understood apart from the broader natural context the ancient Greeks called the cosmos. Presocratic thinkers such as Anaxagoras thought they could explain the cosmos — and the human beings who inhabit it — in strictly material terms. They thought that air, earth, fire, and water were sufficient to account for that material reality. In addition, they tried to identify causal factors that would explain change and movement. This is similar to contemporary explanations that try to account for mind and ideas in terms of evolutionary biology or computer technology. But those sciences are insufficient to explain what matters most in human life.
The explanation of ideas and mind introduced in Plato’s Phaedo is incomplete. Other Platonic dialogues elaborate and expand on that way of thinking about human beings and about the broader world of which we are a part. But the vision in the Phaedo shows what must be included in any satisfactory account of human nature. Mind and ideas transcend individual and isolated human brains. This does not mean that brains are unimportant. The Orphic/Pythagorean mythology that imagines souls hopping from brain to brain has no solid rational support, and it is left behind when the dialectic moves to a more satisfactory account of human existence in terms of mind and ideas. Human bodies and the brains they contain manifest ideas. It is precisely those ideas that make genuine science possible. The Human Genome project, Darwin’s theory of evolution, computer science, Newton’s laws of motion, Einstein’s account of relativity, and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle are examples of such ideas. But those ideas are not limited to the brains of Newton, Darwin, Einstein, or Heisenberg. They are at home in the realm of the mind, which is an essential part of the cosmos. Mind is not, as some Platonists have suggested, a separate world or another reality that lies outside of our universe. Plato’s dialogues provide devastating arguments against that kind of dualism. Mind and ideas are necessary to explain human nature and the nature of the world we inhabit.
Is mind immortal? Unlike individual bodies and their brains, mind and the ideas it manifests do not die when individuals die. Newton’s laws still exist even thought Newton’s body long ago became food for worms. Darwin’s ideas about natural selection continue to thrive in the life of the mind in the 21st century. Socrates’ method of thinking is as vital today as it was in Plato’s Academy. In that sense, mind is immortal. I think that is what Plato was trying to show us in the dialectical development of the Phaedo and his other dialogues on this topic. Plato’s account of Socrates’ final hours is about life, not about death.
Socrates: Then answer this question: What is in a body that makes it live?
Cebes: Soul.
Socrates: Is this always true?
Cebes: Yes.
Socrates: Then whatever soul occupies, it always brings it to life.
Cebes: It does.
Socrates: What is the opposite of life?
Cebes: Death.
Socrates: Based on what we have established earlier, is it safe to say soul will never admit the opposite of what it brings?
Cebes: It is safe to say so.
Socrates: What did we call the idea that does not admit the form of the even?
Cebes: The odd.
Socrates: What about the forms that repel the musical and the just?
Cebes: The unmusical and the unjust.
Socrates: Well, then, what do we call the form that does not admit death?
Cebes: Immortal.
Socrates: Does soul admit death?
Cebes: No.
Socrates: Then soul is immortal.
Cebes: Yes.
Socrates: Cebes, may we say that we have proved that this is so?
Cebes: Yes, Socrates, we have proved it decisively (Plato’s Phaedo, Agora Publications, 2005, Greek page 105).
In this passage Socrates is talking not about the Orphic/Pythagorean soul as it was discussed in the first part of the dialogue but about the living mind that accounts for the order of the cosmos. This applies to the motions of the planets and the stars as well as the civic order required to allow human beings to live in cities.
Even though many people have appealed to Plato’s dialogues for insight about what they considered to be divine, the dialectical process manifested in those dialogues admits and supports only what can be justified by rational analysis and sound argument. That is the method Socrates specifically endorsed in Phaedo.
Socrates: As I continued my search, I thought that I should be careful not to blind my mind’s eye the way some people ruin their bodily eyes by looking directly at the sun during an eclipse, rather than looking at an image of the sun reflected in water or a similar material. I was afraid that my soul might be blinded if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to grasp them with any of my other senses alone. I thought it would be necessary to appeal to reasoning [100] when seeking reality and truth. But perhaps that comparison is not quite right, since I would not say that people who contemplate reality by reasoning are merely working with images. At any rate, this is how I proceed in every inquiry. First I select the account of the matter that seems to be the strongest, and then I consider whatever agrees with it to be true — whether it concerns causality or anything else. Whatever disagrees with that account I assume to be false. Maybe I should explain what I mean more clearly, because I’m not sure you understand what I am saying.
Cebes: No, Socrates, I definitely do not understand.
Socrates: What I am about to say is not new. It is what I was saying earlier in this conversation and what I say always and everywhere. In trying to explain the nature of causality, I will return to those familiar ideas and begin there. First I assume the existence of beauty itself, goodness itself, greatness itself, and other such forms. If you will grant that, then I hope to show you the nature of causality and that soul is immortal.
Cebes: I do grant that, so please go ahead.
Socrates: Then consider my next step and see whether you think it is a good one. I think that if anything is beautiful other than beauty itself, then it can only be beautiful because it takes part in beauty itself. And I would say the same of everything else. Do you agree with this idea of causality?
Cebes: I do agree.
Socrates: I simply do not understand those clever causes the others have proposed. If someone tells me that bright color or a certain shape makes something beautiful, I ignore such explanations, because they confuse me. I simply and perhaps naively hold with confidence the view that nothing makes anything beautiful other than the presence or participation of beauty itself, in whatever way that comes about. I do not pretend to know how it happens, but I am confident that it is beauty that makes all beautiful things beautiful. That seems to be the most reliable answer I can give to myself and to others. As long as I hold to it, I am confident I will remain firm and secure. I think it is safe for me and everyone else to answer that it is by beauty that beautiful things become beautiful. Will you agree with that (Plato’s Phaedo, Agora Publications, 2005, Greek page s 99-100)?
Cebes: I will.
Human Nature in the 21st Century
The interpretation of Plato’s worldview I have been developing is a long way from the dualism of the Orphic/Pythagorean tradition that was popular during Plato’s day. Plato’s dialectical way of thinking would embrace the natural sciences, but it would also incorporate politics, ethics, and the creative arts. Only through a comprehensive approach that incorporates what is best in human beings is it possible to account for human nature.
The next mindcastä in this series on human nature will examine a recent film for which a contemporary physicist and his bother wrote the script. The physicist is Fritjof Capra. He drew upon his book The Turning Point and collaborated with his brother, filmmaker Bernt Capra, to make the film MindWalk. That film suggests the outline of a contemporary way of thinking about human nature that blends science, politics, and art.
